A new poll covering all of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces was released today by The Washington Post, ABC News, the British Broadcasting Corp. and ARD television. Let’s go over some of the polls main findings:

Afghans are more pessimistic about the direction of their country, less confident in the ability of the United States and its allies to provide security and more willing to negotiate with the Taliban than they were a year ago, according to a new poll conducted in all of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces.

Overall, the trends in the country are on a downward slope as faith in the Afghan central government and international presence are falling in the eyes of the Afghan populace. Nearly a year ago 70% of Afghans said they thought the country was heading in the ‘right direction’ while today only 59% say so. I guess I use the term ‘only’ loosely as less than 50% of Americans think we are on the right track. Nevertheless, this is not a positive development as faith in the Afghan government and international presence to bring about positive progress in the country is clearly fading.

On the bright side:

The new poll – conducted by The Washington Post, ABC News, the British Broadcasting Corp. and ARD television of Germany – found a particularly notable shift in public opinion in Helmand province, where Marines have been conducting intensive counterinsurgency operations. The number of people in Helmand describing their security as “good” jumped from 14 percent in a December 2009 poll to 67 percent now. Nearly two-thirds of Helmand residents now say Afghanistan is on the right track.

Bringing stability and security to Helmand and Kandahar Provinces is one of the key aspects of the American surge strategy and these numbers bring some hope. However, we have to be skeptical of any poll taken in an area under duress or serious instability. These numbers are also likely very fungible, that is, the situation can change to the other side quickly. This uptick in ‘good’ security could be because there are all of a sudden thousand of Americans troops hanging around town. These troops aren’t going to be there forever, heck, they may be for the most part gone in 2011.

About those American troops:

A year ago, 61 percent of Afghans supported the deployment of 30,000 additional U.S. troops. In the new poll, 49 percent support the move, with 49 percent opposed.

This obviously shows some disenchantment with how the surge has worked out so far. Not only have some Afghans become discouraged by the lack of progress in the stability/security realm, but others may have had their lives directly negatively impacted by a larger foreign troop presence (ie. night raids). The 49%, and high threshold of 61%, still shows that there is likely a plurality of Afghan citizens that want US troops to stay as long as they are making a more promising future for the locals.

Now on to the Taliban:

Afghans overwhelmingly prefer the current government over the Taliban, and almost three in four continue to say it was good that the U.S. military toppled the Taliban in 2001, although that number is nine points lower than it was a year ago.

9. Who would you rather have ruling Afghanistan today: the current government, or the Taliban?

            Current
           government   Taliban   Other (vol.)   No opinion
11/13/10       86          9           1              5
12/23/09       90          6           *              3
1/12/09        82          4          10              4
11/7/07        84          4           6              6
10/19/06       88          3           4              5
10/18/05       91          1           2              6

For the US, and in my opinion for an Afghanistan with a bright future, these numbers are inspiring. The Taliban had a chance to rule most of Afghanistan and they did so in one of the most brutal and totalitarian ways imaginable. Yes, they may bring a form of stability, but fear, poverty, and repression come along with it. However, it must be observed that the Taliban rule is on a slight rise, which brings me to my last observation from the poll:

Overall, nearly three-quarters of Afghans now believe their government should pursue negotiations with the Taliban, with almost two-thirds willing to accept a deal allowing Taliban leaders to hold political office. Nearly a third of adults see the Taliban as more moderate today than they were when they ruled the country.

The Afghans have lived lives of warfare for a majority of the past 30 years and it should surprise no one that most are willing to make tough to swallow deals for a more stable, fruitful future. The question’s ‘hold political office’ is obviously vague (Post Master General?) and leaves room for interpretation by the poll participant. It also does not surprise me that many Afghans are starting to see the Taliban as more moderate than when they ruled the country as with time, harsh memories become softer (while in no way comparing him to the Taliban!, just look at former President George W. Bush’s recent poll numbers). This is also an indictment on the Karzai administration’s failure to bring about any real substantive change for the better.

You can check out the whole poll here. What results shout out to you?

The reality of war in 30 seconds…..

A former intelligence official called it a “high-level asset meeting gone bad.” Bad is definitely an understatement. Of course the comment is in reference to the suicide attack which killed 7 CIA agents at Forward Operating Base Chapman in border province of Khost. They were “experienced frontline officers and their knowledge and expertise will be sorely missed,” said Henry A. Crumpton, who led the CIA campaign in Afghanistan in 2001 and 2002. The attacker was a potential informant of the Haqqani network of the Taliban and was wearing an Afghan National Army uniform at the time of the attack. Apparently, the perpetrator made it through one checkpoint and blew himself and several others away before he was to be searched for weapons. The Pakistani and Afghan Taliban have both claimed responsibility for the attack, with one specific Taliban leader stating that the attack was in revenge for CIA-led drone attacks.

This tragic incident highlights numerous issues challenging the US/NATO presence in Afghanistan. First off, it is indeed the nature of the covert intelligence game that one has to trust those who you really cannot trust. The CIA in Afghanistan need to gather information on Al Qaeda and the Taliban leadership and organization and to do this human intelligence is a vital component. After all, the drones don’t just know where the bad guys are hiding by themselves.

This specific incident, which involved a supposed Afghan Army member, also portrays the difficulties in discerning friend from foe. How serious is this issue to the Obama administration’s Afghan strategy? Vital would be an understatement. Key to future stability of Afghanistan, and to a lessening of a foreign military presence, is the growth in size and capability of the Afghan army and police. The Taliban of course know this and will do whatever they can to undermine its progress. A great way to do this is to infiltrate the Afghan army and police ranks with your own soldiers and inflict demoralizing and strategic calamities, such as this Chapman CIA incident and the shooting of five British soldiers by an Afghan police officer last month. Throw in the fact that the Afghan government, and its foreign purse holders, are desperate to build up the Army and police numbers and it should not surprise us that some ‘bad apples’ are mixed into the bunch. If I were the Taliban, this is what I would do.

Nevertheless, in terms of the CIA’s presence in Afghanistan, it is still critical to have an on the ground footprint in Afghanistan’s most volatile southeastern regions. The drone attacks have had a major impact on downgrading the Taliban and Al Qaeda’s leadership and the pressure must be maintained. This likely cannot happen if the CIA has to move out of Khost, Kandahar, etc. It has been reported that the CIA presence in Afghanistan is to increase by about 20-25% along with the surge in US/NATO troops this coming year, but one can bet that this Chapman attack will change some of the calculus on how the agency operates.

"War is Hard!"

Stanley McChrystal’s Long War – Dexter Filkins excellent profile  of America’s top commander in Afghanistan clearly showcases the challenges of going ‘all-in’ and ‘getting out’.  McChrystal comes off as vibrant, smart, and worthy General, but the task ahead of him is depicted as likely insurmountable. Here are some choice bits…

McChrystal on counterinsurgency:

“The insurgency has to have access to the people,” McChrystal told me. “So we literally want to go in there and squat among the people. We want to make the insurgents come to us. Make them be the aggressors. What I want to do is get on the inside, looking out — instead of being on the outside looking in.”

McChrystal on negotiating with parts of the Taliban:

“Pashtun culture adjudicates disagreements in a way that mitigates blood feuds. The Pashtun people go out of their way not to do things that cause permanent feuds. They have always been willing to change positions, change sides. I don’t think much of the Taliban are ideologically driven; I think they are practically driven. I’m not sure they wouldn’t flip to our side.”

Filkins felt that McChrystal had undervalued the importance of Karzai’s legitimacy:

But increasingly, McChrystal, as well as President Obama and the American people, are being forced to confront the possibility that they will be stuck fighting and dying and paying for a government that is widely viewed as illegitimate.

When I asked McChrystal about this, it was the one issue that he seemed not to have thought through. What if the Afghan people see their own government as illegitimate? How would you fight for something like that?

“Then we are going to have to avoid looking like we are part of the illegitimacy,” the general said. “That is the key thing.”

Filkins does a fair job in showing both sides of the debate facing the Obama administration right now, more troops to fight the Taliban or a more Al Qaeda-focused counterterrorism strategy, but the aspects that stayed with me the most were the words of Afghans in the Taliban controlled south who voiced their concern that the US could not be trusted because there was no telling how long they would be there.  On the other hand, the Taliban weren’t going anywhere.  This factor alone affects nearly all other strategic inputs and outputs.

Think Again: God – Vaunted religious historian Karen Armstrong tackles conventional wisdom on the role and importance of religion in today’s Western world.  Armstrong tackles such topics and ‘truths’ as ‘God is Dead’, ‘God and Politics Don’t Mix’, and ‘God Breeds Violence and Intolerance’.  Armstrong reminds us that religion continues to be a major factor in US culture and politics and international relations.

The Next 100 Years – Stratfor lead analyst George Friedman takes a stab at predicting the next century’s major geopolitical shifts and events.  Here’s his eye-grabbing introduction: “Japan and Turkey form an alliance to attack the US. Poland becomes America’s closest ally. Mexico makes a bid for global supremacy, and a third world war takes place in space….”

US Arms Sales – This is more a bit of news than an analysis, but the facts here tell an astounding story. American arms sales lead the world and its not even close.  The US sold nearly 70% of all global arms with total sales reaching nearly $38 billion.  Second place?  Italy with $3.7.  Now that’s a gap!

Assassination: A Brief History – This one’s pretty self explanatory.  Like all policies or strategies, assassination has its benefits and drawbacks.  

Iraq-Afghanistan-Pakistan Op-chart – A simple, but telling story of the progress in Iraq, and degradation of Afghanistan and Pakistan in the last few years.  Short and sweet geopolitical info!

The CIA in Double Jeopardy – Another good reason why the Obama administration should drop their prosecution of CIA agents.

That’s it.  Well, almost….

Obama To Enter Diplomatic Talks With Raging Wildfire

Rashid, a highly touted Pakistani journalist, begins the final chapter of his 2000 ‘Taliban’ by calling the country one of world’s ‘orphaned conflict’s’.  The country would quickly change from being orphaned to a month after 9/11 being the center of global politics, as the United States uprooted the Taliban government and sent them packing, unfortunately for only a short-term vacation.

Rashid’s valuable book walks its readers through a rather dense social, religious, military, and even psychological history of the group of radicalized Pashtuns, known as the Taliban.  He provides a solid regional historical overview and does not forget the many geopolitical actors involved in the fragmented country (Iran, Turkmenistan, Saudi Arabia, etc.).  A solid half of the book details the violent rise to power of the Taliban as they battled first fellow Pashtun groups, than the government in Kabul, and finally the Northern Alliance actors, which would never relinquish their autonomy to Taliban-ruled Kabul and Kandahar.  This book is worth reading just for those who don’t know just how fractious the Afghan society can be with many various ethnicities and sects, all with foreign partners, that have had to violently attempt to protect themselves and further their own people’s positions.  This book, just like Afghanistan today, is full of conflict and violence that shows no real sign of ebbing.

Rashid provides a telling description of the early members of the Taliban (around 1994) as Afghans born in Pakistan and raised mainly by madrassas as their parents, especially mothers, may have been lost in the years of fighting during and after the Soviet invasion and withdrawal.  These young men had ‘no memories of the past, no plans for the future’ and knew of nothing else but their Taliban leaders.  Like we have heard many times in reference to terrorist and gang groups, the Taliban offered these men, and boys, a meaning to their lives that they could embrace and fight for.

This type of camaraderie of course becomes dangerous when it is based on ignorant, stubborn, violent, yet a strong ideology and form of Islam, as they, the Taliban, surely had.  The Taliban, which by 1996 controlled large swaths of Afghan territory, including Kabul, ruled with a fundamental Islamic iron fist that showed no accommodation, not even towards UN aid providers.  The Taliban was controlling a large population and recruiting members with a version of Islam that ‘divested’ it of nearly all of its positive legacies, including Islamic philosophy, science, arts, civil society, etc.  It was the Taliban’s way or the knife.  One has never read about a more oppressive society.

The Taliban did not become the Taliban, or rule, in a vacuum.  They were of course incubated and constantly nourished by the Pakistani government and ISI.  When the Taliban needed more troops in their battles with Masud and what would become the Northern Alliance, Pakistan would just close some of their madrassas in FATA or the Northwest Provinces and send the men over the border.  Rashid, who also spends time on Osama bin Ladin’s terrorist network in Afghanistan, accurately predicted that the Pakistani state and military were creating their own nightmare with their support of the Taliban, instead of the ‘strategic depth’ they aimed for.  The author stated that the Islamic fundamentalism, drugs, weapons, and social breakdown that the Pakistani government was assisting the Taliban in performing or using, was making Islamabad ‘ripe for a Taliban-style Islamic revolution.’  While what is occurring today in Pakistan is so far, thankfully, not this extreme, it is too close for comfort.

Rashid’s ‘Taliban’ also details the human and women right’s abuses by the Taliban in great detail.  In addition, Rashid spends several chapters describing the ‘great game’ of pipeline politics in the Central Asia region and not surprisingly was correct in his assessment that Afghanistan, and the region as a whole, was just too unstable for Western groups to come in and build major gas and oil pipelines, no matter how much they wanted too.  Though these pipeline chapters were well researched, they can be passed over by most readers.

Rashid’s book provides much more than the history and make-up of a group that the powerful United States military is having a hell of a time defeating, it brings to life the challenging modern history of a people who have only known violence in their lives.  It is sad to think that one cannot imagine this changing in the near or even long-term future.  Though Rashid’s work is far from perfect, too many assumptions presented as facts (he is a journalist by trade), it brings light on a dangerous and important group, geopolitical actors and actions in a key region of the world, and on the suffering of millions.

I am near the end of Ahmed Rashid’s Taliban and though I will write up a full review in the very near future, there are a few items I read this morning that I would like to discuss right now. The book was researched, written, and published in 2000, just months ahead of 9/11, but it is so prescient that it actually appears to have been produced after the towers fell and every American knew who the Taliban were and where the state of Afghanistan was (well, at least should have!). While Rashid’s important and informative book meticulously tells the story of the Taliban’s rise and examines the geopolitical aspects of the region and its actors, I want to focus on his assessment of US policy and strategy towards Afghanistan and the Taliban during this Post-Cold War, Pre-9/11 time period, or at least two crucial aspects of it.

Rashid is very critical of the lack of any coherent US policy and strategy toward the region and its extremely muddled and ever-changing view and stance towards a Taliban group with control of most, but not all, of the Afghan state. Rashid stated; ‘The USA dealt with issues as they came up, in a haphazard, piecemeal fashion, rather than applying a coherent, strategic vision to the region…US policy towards the Taliban… were driven by domestic American politics or attempted quick-fix solutions rather than a strategic policy.’ This assessment is doubt accurate as during the 1990s the US did not have an Afghan or Central Asian policy to speak of, and this has been pointed out again and again by many people. But hindsight is 20/20 and I can’t find myself getting to upset at US officials and the first Bush, Clinton, and early second Bush administrations for their lack of strategy on this faraway, seemingly insignificant region of the world. But this lack of attention and effective, coherent strategy cost the US and the world a tremendous amount of pain and a wound that is still far, far from healed. The opportunity given to the groups like the Taliban and Al Qaeda to grow and fester by the lack of world and US attention cannot be repeated. This is an especially important lesson to keep in mind during these trying economic and domestic-centric times as security threats do not disappear because we have other problems. So far the Obama administration seems to be aware of this pitfall and looks to be actively engaged in many of the world’s hot spots.

The second fascinating aspect Rashid discusses in terms of US policy toward the Taliban is how domestic issues and constraints affected our view and strategy toward the group and region. Though I don’t want to go into too many details, and Rashid for that matter doesn’t really either, Rashid claims that the US for most of the mid-90′s actually backed the Taliban’s rise and hold on power, as US sought regional stability above all else. Rashid then acknowledges that the US started to dismiss this ‘realist’ view of the Taliban for two disparate reasons: One based on security, one based liberal human rights.

The security issue is obviously the presence of Osama bin Ladin in Afghanistan and the Taliban’s protection of the wanted terrorist, who in 1998 organized the bombings of two US embassies in Africa. This issue obviously soured relations between the US and the Taliban, but Rashid seems to assert that another issue was more influential in disrupting US-Taliban relations, women’s rights. He writes, ‘The US rejection of the Taliban was largely because of the pressure exerted by the feminist movement at home.’ Rashid provides a modicum of evidence to back up this claim, including the lobbying of Hollywood activists, Hillary Clinton, Jay Leno’s wife, and other feminist groups on the Clinton administration in the late 90s. Rashid is correct in noting that Sec of State Madeleine Albright put her stamp on the US view of the Taliban by calling the group ‘despicable’ while on a trip to Pakistan. Rashid asserts that Clinton couldn’t ignore these liberal women votes, but this is mildly questionable as the issue only took momentum around 1998, when Clinton was already reelected. In any case, it is a significant example of how both domestic constituencies and liberal views, such as international human rights, can affect foreign policy, specifically America’s.

Extra Goodies:

1. Steven R. David tells you why you should worry about Pakistan’s nukes.

2. Selig S. Harrison breaks down Pakistan’s ethnic make-up and how they strongly affect its foreign and domestic policies, especially in regards to fighting native Taliban groups.

3. Pakistani blogger Fatima Bhutto asks the US to stop ‘spoiling‘ her country.

President Obama fulfilled one of his main campaign promises on Tuesday, a major increase of US soldiers deployed to Afghanistan.  The US plans to send 8,000 this spring, followed by groups of 4,000 and 5,000 during the summer, for a total of about 17,000 troops, or about 50% of the 36,000 Americans already stationed in the volatile country.

The attention, or more accurate, the lack there of, this has gotten in the media is appalling.  On the day of the announcement, CBS Evening News with Katie Couric had it as the fourth storyline of the day, behind the Stimulus passage (ok) and the Aroid scandal (not ok).  And today, the second news morning after the announcement, not one story from any major newspaper (realclearpolitics).  Heck, I write a blog called ‘Afghanistan’ and I didn’t even write about it! (My Foreign Policy Association ‘Afghanistan and Central Asia’ blog has been split in two).  The Iraq ‘surge’ was just a little over 20,000 troops and I recall it being a ‘big deal’.  Not only should the media do its job of examining the how’s, why’s, and the ‘what’s’ of this Afghan troop surge, but it also owes it to the men and women who are about to do tremendously difficult work in a dangerous and unstable region.  

Anyway, what really concerns me is that there does not seem to be a comprehensive strategy to go along with these troops.  In a written statement, (no time for a press conference or speech), Obama really only justifies the troop surge as ‘necessary to stabilize a deteriorating situation.’  Obama and his JCS have already leaked that they are likely to have a more ‘realistic’ approach to the conflict, trying to bring stability and security first, democracy and Afghan good governance second, but I want to hear some explanation how these troops will lead to that.  The Iraqi surge did come with a General Petraeus counterinsurgency plan attached to it and had his rock solid leadership.  

I have long advocated for a more sophisticated and comprehensive view of the challenges US/NATO/Afghan/Pakistani government face in this conflict, and despite the recent lackluster of coverage, I believe it has started to happen.  After all, I support sending more troops to Afghanistan, and have for awhile, I just know that it will take much more than just fresh soldiers on the ground to bring peace and stability to the region.  

Here’s a rundown on the problems these new soldiers and the US military faces in Afghanistan:

a rural-based insurgency, an enemy sanctuary in neighboring Pakistan, the chronic weakness of the Afghan government, a thriving narcotics trade, poorly developed infrastructure, and forbidding terrain.

US marines in Afghanistan's Nuristan Province (New York Times)

We need a strategy.  We cannot just double-down on the Petraeus Iraqi counterinsurgency strategy, though some of its ‘secure and hold’ methods will be useful, many others won’t in the Afghan conflict.  The Bush team held a top secret comprehensive review of the Afghan situation and I know that Obama has it on his table right now, but we in the public have still been kept in the dark.  

What will be the overriding use of these troops? Will they protect Kabul and its surrounding area, like the first group of soldiers sent in January, or will they be sent to volatile south?  Will the US back Karzai in the upcoming election or try someone with less baggage (remember all those calls for Maliki’s head in Iraq?)?  Will raids into Pakistan continue, increase?  Are we okay with Pakistan government’s recent deal with in the Swat region, allowing Sharia and Taliban law? (Holbrooke says ‘no’)  What will be the counter narcotics strategy?  How will aid more effectively reach the Afghan citizens and improve their economy?What will be expected from the other NATO members?  And HOW LONG will US troops be stationed in Afghan?  Are we there until Afghan is stable?  Al Qaeda is defeated?  The Taliban are defeated?  Afghanistan is a democracy?  We run out of money and men?  The San Francisco Giants win the World Series?  (Don’t worry, that’s next year!)

Too many questions left unanswered.  The Afghanistan conflict will indeed be a stiff test for Obama, America, NATO, and of course those in the region seeking peace and freedom.