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I just finished watching Questar’s Modern Warfare ‘Russia in Afghanistan’ documentary and it contained some great and dramatic footage of the ten year war, which ended in yet another defeat of a world power in the Hindu Kush.  Many elements of this bygone war are strikingly similar to the current NATO/Afghan government led war against the Taliban and other insurgents.

Though I could not find an excerpt of the film I watched, here is one from CNN that covers some of the same literal and visual material:

YouTube Preview Image

One of  the main themes of the Afghan-Russia war was the Russian use of heavy, large military units and vehicles, which were countered effectively by the mobile and translucent mujahideen.  The Russians massive mechanical army and tactics, like their insurgents’ small, but dedicated efforts, were visual symbols of actors in the conflict.  The Soviets were a great power with resources and technology at their side and the Pashtun mujahideen were seemingly weak and backward.  We of course all now know what was the side to bet on, as the Russians were forced to leave their Soviet-backed government to be overrun at the end of ten years of fighting in 1989.  

Many of the reasons for the Soviet defeat can be seen in today’s NATO/US conflict, but there are some ‘hopeful’ differences.  The documentary wonderfully shows the beautiful, yet amazingly challenging terrain and weather of the Hindu Kush. The Mujahideen skillfully used the terrain to their advantage forcing the Soviets into bottlenecks and treacherous corridors were they could inflict the most damage.  They also used an intricate system of caves to hide and fallback from Soviet offensives.  Both of these attributes can be seen today, as the Taliban attack and then retreat into their mountain caves, daring US/NATO troops to come after them.  Another similarity is mujahideen’s growing strategic skills and aggressiveness.  As the Soviet-Afghan war went on, mujahideen forces became more and more aggressive and started successfully targeting major military and government bases inside of Afghanistan.  These attacks greatly reduced morale and the legitimacy of the Soviet-backed Afghan army.  Unfortunately, this tactic has been used somewhat successfully by the insurgents in today’s conflict, as there has been increasing attacks in Kabul against government institutions, a major attack on French held military base, and of course the tremendously successful assault on a large prison, freeing hundreds of captured insurgents.  These type of offensive attacks have led people in the West to question are ability to win the conflict.  Lastly, the amount of resources, troops and money, being spent in Afghanistan by an outside power, before Russia, now the US, is another accurate comparison.  The Russians spent millions updating their military and sending in ever more troops for the conflict and the US is indeed following a similar path.

As much as the similarities are evident in the two Afghan conflicts, there is also much different, with hopefully in a few years a stable, democratic Afghan society being the greatest example.  The first major difference that comes to mind is the difference in Soviet and NATO tactics.  The Soviets used a much harsher and blunt military and political strategy in the conflict, displacing millions of Afghans and killing hundreds of thousands.  Though the US/NATO led conflict has indeed led to the displacement and deaths of thousands, the degree is to much less an extent, and it is definitely not the professed policy to do so. There is also a major difference in the Western and Soviet-backed governments in place during the conflict, as though both lack(ed) full legitimacy, there is still an important difference in degrees.  The Karzai government was partially elected and is up for reelection this coming new year and has the support of almost the entire international community.  This brings up another key difference, and that is the international and multilateral backing and participation of the current situation, something missing from the Soviet invasion.  

Lastly, in a disturbing trend, the use of suicide attacks during this conflict is a dramatic change from the 1980s Soviet conflict.  Though the Soviet war had many elements involving religious sentiments, including support by Saudi Arabia and from Muslims around the world, this current conflict involves tremendous religious overtones and Islam is a major recruiting tool for the Taliban and other insurgent groups.  To me there is a stark difference in a guerilla war involving insurgency tactics and motivations and one involving suicide missions.  It is a disturbing trend in the Muslim world.

There are many similarities and differences between the two conflicts that I may have missed or did not have time to elaborate, so please fill me and my readers in by commenting.  Do any of the similarities portend to what the conclusion of the conflict may be?  Any of the differences?

For more of a background on the history of Afghanistan/Pakistan and how the Russia conflict helped shape what we are seeing today check out these two articles:

1. Seth G. Jones. “The Rise of Afghanistan’s Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad.” International Security 32 4 (Spring 2008): 7-40.

2. Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason. “No Sign until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier.” International Security 32 4 (Spring 2008): 41-77.

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Dec

NSA Declassifies Cold War Materials

   Posted by: Pat    in Russia   Print Print

Though I know the big news today is Obama’s announcement and introduction of his national security team, I would like to first discuss a story that’s been sitting in my ‘post queue’ for quite some time, the releasing of US National Security Agency (NSA) archives, and I will get to the new Obama team either later today or tomorrow.

National Security Agency headquarters, Fort George Meade, Maryland

In response to a declassification request by the National Security Archive, the NSA has declassified large portions of a four-part, top secret study, American Cryptology during the Cold War.  The declassified information was put in the hands of NSA historian Thomas Johnson, who then researched and published a large report of his findings.  According to Matthew Aid, a National Security Archive visiting fellow and author of the forthcoming The Secret Sentry: The Top Secret History of the National Security Agency, the three parts released so far provide a ‘frank assessment of the history of the Agency and its forerunners, warts-and-all.’  

The released documents discuss the beginning signal intelligence (SIGNIT) and communications intelligence (COMINT) challenges for the organizations, especially in regard to breaking Soviet codes.  Johnson’s report goes over the Agency’s greatest successes (predicting the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan) and some of its key failures (the placement of nuclear missiles in Cuba).  Here is a list of some of the more interesting findings released:

 

  • After the end of World War II, with Soviet codes still unbreakable, the U.S. Army and Navy SIGINT organizations had relatively little to listen to. Johnson’s history reveals that as of mid-1946, the most productive source available to the U.S. Army SIGINT organization was French communications, which accounted for half of the finished reporting going to intelligence consumers in Washington.
  • SIGINT coverage of the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China by the Air Force Security Agency (an NSA predecessor) during the early 1950s was so bad that a senior CIA official referred to this period as “the dark ages for communications intelligence.”
  • The discovery of high-level Soviet spies operating inside the Australian government in 1947 led the U.S. to cut off Australian access to classified U.S. government information, which was not resumed until two years later in 1949. Full SIGINT cooperation with Australia did not resume until 1953.
  • Relations between senior officials at the CIA and NSA were at times so bad that they impeded cooperation between the two agencies. The CIA deliberately cut NSA out of the famous Berlin Tunnel operation (1954-1956), with NSA’s director, General Ralph Canine, finding out about the operation from the New York Times after the Soviets discovered the Tunnel in April 1956.
  • By the early 1960s, the NSA was beginning to encounter information overload as more and more intercepted messages were stored in huge warehouses of magnetic tapes. According to Johnson, “the volume of unprocessed … tape was becoming difficult to manage technically and was embarrassing politically.”

Though I know many will still desire a greater amount of transparency from American intelligence groups like the NSA and the CIA, there are obvious reasons why certain items need to be kept hidden for lengthy periods of time.  I am encouraged at this seemingly unfiltered release of previously classified Cold War material and look forward to more in the future.  Many will also be interested to know more about the NSA’s current role in domestic wire tapping, but I doubt any information about this will be released anytime soon.  For those interested in reading more about the history and current work of the NSA, I recommend James Bamford’s ‘The Puzzle Palace,’ ‘A Pretext for War’, and his forthcoming ‘The Shadow Factory.’ 

(Photo Source: The National Security Archive)

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