The world today is making me nervous. Though pundits have been predicting troubled times and imminent catastrophes for years and this has only increased with the rise of China and the financial crisis, I have felt that the world, due mainly to US security power blankets and the growth of globalization, was stable and major crises were for the most part, unlikely to occur. The events of the past few weeks have caused this feeling to fade, however. Turkey and Brazil’s confident move to make a deal with Iran over the wishes of nearly all the world’s major powers, especially the superpower United States,  joined the Times Square attempted bombing, a growing oil crisis in the Gulf of Mexico that the US government seems incapable of stopping, Greek financial tragedy seemingly bringing the EU down with it, the North Korean sinking of Cheonan, Japan’s Prime Minister merry-go-round, Chinese-US military relations faltering, and now we have the flotilla incident raising all kinds of hell. It just seems like no one is at the wheel of a truck that may be veering of the highway. Or as Walter Russell Mead recently stated, ‘The world is getting more complicated — and more dangerous — all the time.’

In many ways this is what a multi-polar world would start to look like. A problem occurs and no one is really sure who to turn to and therefore each actor quickly looks out for the their own best interests. At times this can lead to a stable equilibrium, however in other periods it can breed miscalculations that lead to tragic conflicts. Before I get too alarming here, I should note that a serious international conflict does not appear imminent, no matter how many ‘humanitarian’ flotillas head to Gaza. But the apprehension in the air is real and I think it accurate to state that there are more unknowns in our current international security apparatus than known’s.

Speaking of Mead, he has a fascinating analysis of Turkey and Brazil’s recent aggressive foreign policy moves and what it means for and says about the United States. Here is an excerpt:

Both Turkey and Brazil are at a point in time when both their external and internal situations favor anti-US foreign policy moves.  In the Middle East, taking an anti-American line builds Turkish influence and opens doors across the region.  Fading Russian and European power in the Middle East creates a vacuum which a newly ambitious Turkey can hope to fill; anti-American and anti-Israel policies win friends and supporters for Turkey as it flexes its regional muscles.  (Fading Russian power also makes Turkey less afraid of its northern neighbor; Turkey feels increasingly confident that it can manage its relationship with Russia without an American big brother to protect it.)  In Latin America, strategic neglect and strategic failure by three American administrations (Clinton, Bush, Obama) have left the United States with fewer friends, more enemies, and less leverage than at any time since World War Two.  Argentina, Brazil’s historical rival in South America, is confused and distracted with a weak political establishment and weak economy; alienated from the United States and concerned with internal economic issues, Argentina is in no position to undercut Brazil’s latest attempt to establish itself as the leading power in South America.  By playing an anti-American card, Lula builds support for his vision and his party in Brazil, even as he relegates Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez to the second division in Latin America.  In the short run, the Brazilian economy has managed the global downturn well; in the long term, the continuing rise of India and China mean that there will be more foreign consumers for Brazil’s exports and investors in its enterprises.  Add to that the impact of massive off-shore oil discoveries, and it is not surprising that Brazil is feeling feisty.

So we have two countries who increasingly want to defy the United States, are able to do so, and find at least in the short term that an anti-American stance enhances their political prospects.  Under these circumstances, we ought not to be surprised by the new directions in Turkish and Brazilian foreign policy.

Do yourself a favor and read the whole darn thing. So do you feel ‘nervous’ about today’s global security environment or I am just being a chicken little here? What makes you especially apprehensive? What calms you down (besides a hot bath, that is)? What are Turkey and Brazil up to and what does it mean for the US? Are the two growing powers really doing what’s in their best interests or can these moves backfire?

'We can still make at least 2 nukes.'

In the past couple days, the world’s great powers have been busy courting and challenging the Middle East’s prospective regional power, Iran. To most people’s surprise, the leaders of Turkey and Brazil reached an agreement with Tehran to transport and hold about half of Iran’s enriched uranium, but the details are still thin. In the deal, it is believed that there are no limits to how high Iran can continue to enrich their kept uranium and unlike the US/European/Russia led deal which Tehran reneged on last year, it would allow Iran to still keep enough uranium to make a nuclear weapon. This announcement has been followed by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s proclamation that the UN Security Council 5 permanent members plus Germany have reached an agreement on a fourth round of sanctions on Iran. It is unknown how extensive the sanctions are as Russia and China have likely watered them down. In any case, it is hoped that if the sanctions are passed, they could be followed by additional individual pressure from the US and European states.

Are these two great power plays contradictory or compatible? The real fear about the Turkey-Brazil-Iran deal is that it will allow Iran to continue its nuclear weapon buildup while having the cover of international legitimacy bestowed on it by Rio and Ankara. Unfortunately, nearly the same thing can be said about the sanctions. The US/EU/Russia/China can look like they are ‘doing something’ to stop Tehran’s nuclear pursuit, but the bottom line is that the Islamic Republic is still in the drivers seat. From what I’ve read, the Turkey-Brazil-Iran deal does not do enough to really stop Iran’s nuclear efforts. As Greg Scoblete of Real Clear World stated: ‘this is the kind of deal that is okay to countries – like Brazil and Turkey – that aren’t terribly concerned with Iran’s nuclear program.’ If this is true, then the deal made could really cause problems for the US, Israel, Europe, Egypt, and all others who fear a nuclear Iran. Apparently, the Obama administration tacitly supported Brazil and Turkey’s rapprochement to Tehran on this issue, but they surely are backtracking now. Clinton has been timid in her remarks about the 3-way deal and stated that ‘the details matter’.

There is hope that the UNSC sanctions are indeed a strong step forward in this process and can lead to further steps that can push Iran into a deal that can keep Iran from weaponizing and a physical confrontation from occurring. Of note, both Turkey and Brazil are currently 2 of the 10 non-permanent members of the UN Security Council and along with the 5 permies, 5 more votes will be needed to pass the sanction resolution. Even if the resolution passes without Turkey and Brazilian support it will suffer some international legitimacy and the Islamic Republic leaders can yak and yak about being unfairly targeted after they already made a ‘fair deal’.

If Turkey and Brazil indeed push against the UNSC sanctions and actively promote their Iranian deal as the only way forward it will be quite the gamble. In effect, they will be choosing the side of Iran. Turkey’s government has been lurching towards south and east and away from the US, Europe, and Israel so this is not that surprising, but Brazil’s choice in the matter is a bit more puzzling. Brazil has a not insignificant amount of trade with Tehran and has butted heads with the US on several minor issues (Honduras election, Colombia basing rights), but this move could really put it on the opposite side of the US on a major foreign policy issue that could become a crisis.

Alas, these moves are still in their early stages and it would not be surprising to see Brazil and Turkey come back into the fold during the coming UNSC resolution debates. We shall see.

What are the threats facing the United States? What are the threats to international security and global stability as a whole? Well, Gallup asked over 1,000 Americans to ‘assess the threat of each of seven international issues to the United States’. While I’m sure that most Americans aren’t qualified to answer questions regarding security threats (although a greater number are getting degrees in homeland security from DHS sponsored college programs), it is still interesting to see what the general public perceives as the greatest threat. People’s responses are no doubt skewed by the media, their religious backgrounds and politics. Here are the results:

First, I will give GPP own answer to this question by listing what I believe to be the greatest threats facing the United States national security and interests today. Secondly, I will give my opinion of what I see as the greatest threats to international security and stability overall in a post to follow.

In the poll above, Americans listed their perceived threats as 1. Terrorism 2. Iran 3. North Korea 4. Israel-Palestine 5. China 6. India-Pakistan 7. Russia. Here’s how I would breakdown the question above, starting from least threatening to most to US security and interests:

Threat #7- The conflict between Israel and the Palestinians - Putting this one as the least threatening I’m sure with displease many people who see in this conflict the root to many of the world’s and America’s problems. Like all of these seven threats, the longstanding Palestinian-Israel conflict is a major factor for global instability and its continued presence no doubt hurts US national security and interests in the Middle East, with its use as a reason for terror attacks being the most central, but it does not have the impact, or potential consequences, to American security interests as the others.

Threat #6 – The conflict between India and Pakistan - This always cold war, sometimes hot war, conflict has been a threat to US interests for decades, but with the current situation in Afghanistan/Pakistan it has taken on a new level. These states both hold nuclear weapons and have a seemingly intractable issue, Kashmir, keeping them at odds. The fact that this conflict is intertwined to the future of Afghanistan and it becomes even more clear how important the resolution, or at least semi-civil containment, of this Pakistan-India conflict is to US interests. The US has a major stake in the stability of the Pakistan government and state, with which it needs to stamp out Al Qaeda and other international extremists. For the US, India is a natural great power partner that can help it to balance against a rising China in South Asia.

Threat #5 – The military power of North Korea - Here is another assessment that I think might surprise people, including many Americans that answered the poll question. Kim Jung Il’s nuclear armed military state is something to worry about indeed, especially if you are South Korea and Japan. North Korea’s government has continued to give narcissistic dictatorship’s a bad name and has successfully denied international pressure to conform to foreign demands for years now. Kim’s government is not shy in testing nuclear weapons nor in building missiles that some estimate will be able to reach California in just a few years. The city of Seoul, Tokyo, Kyoto, etc. are already well-within reach. So why is North Korea’s military power not higher on the list? They are #5 because I believe that Kim’s government, and its likely successor’s, can be deterred. I just can’t foresee Kim actually launching an attack against Seoul, Japan, US, that would surely lead to his and the state’s destruction. This is a tough one though, as Kim’s government has also been caught red-handed providing weapon technology and know-how to Iran, Pakistan, and Syria.

Threat #4 – The military power of Russia - Commentators on this site have criticized my respect for Russia as still a highly relevant player in European and global politics, and this ranking of fourth show’s that there are several greater threats to US interests than Mother Russia, but not many. One of reasons I feel that Moscow is still a major player in the great power game and a threat to US interests and homeland is its proven willingness to use old school power political tools, specifically military and natural resources, to defend its interests and expand its influence. The Georgian-Russian war of 2008 showcases this capability and the fact that Russia has made a deal to build a military base in Abkhazia and keep it there for 49 years leads one to believe that this event was not a one-off. The US relies on a safe and secure Europe and Russia has to still be considered the number one threat to its existence. Concerning the US homeland, Moscow is still the only state on the planet that could destroy all major population centers through the use of a massive nuclear strike. This fact can never be ignored, no matter how unlikely the possible occurrence.

Now that is threatening!

Threat #3 – The military power of Iran - It was difficult to place this higher than the Russian military forces, but Iran deserves to be here, especially in light of the recent IAEA report which states that the Islamic Republic has been working on weaponizing a nuclear device. Iran’s military does not come close to touching Moscow’s, but the Islamic Republic’s intentions and proximity to Afghanistan, Iraq, oil-filled allies, and Europe makes it a more direct threat to US interests. The Islamic Republic has based part of its legitimacy as a fighter against the ‘Great Satan’ and has fought against US interests in Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan (at times), North Korea, Syria, and I could go on. Though I believe an Iranian government in control of nukes will be mostly rational, and therefore deterrable, I am much less confident about this than I am about North Korea. Iran has been given the opportunity by a rather pliant American administration to bring itself back into line with most of the international community, in a sense ‘come out from the cold’, and shown time and time again it is unwilling to do so. Unless the Islamic Republic is overthrown, there aren’t really any good signs that this will end well.

Threat #2 – International Terrorism - The American public’s number #1 is not quite mine, but who could blame them. It seems like everyday one turns on the television, opens their newspaper, or clicks on a website there is yet another story about a terror attack directed at either American interests or homeland. From the panty-bomber, US Army member Hassan, Zazi, David Headley, the Bronx group, to the fact that America’s number intelligence leader says that an attempted attack on the homeland in the next 6 months is a ‘certainty‘, it should come in surprise that 81% of Americans view international terrorism as a major threat. I too believe international terrorism, specifically of the Islamic extremists nature, is the most immediate threat to America’s homeland. Unfortunately, there are just too many fanatics out there that believe the United States is the cause of their or their people’s problems and that the only way for them to rectify the situation is to kill themselves and as many of us as possible. So international terrorism is very serious challenge facing the US, and it will be for a long time, but it’s not the number one threat. That honor goes to….

Threat #1 – The military power of China - The blog’s called Great Power Politics after all, so how could I not put the battle between the world’s two greatest behemoths number one? I can’t! Cold-blooded IR realists see this picture: a superpower in likely decline relative to a rising great power who no doubt has superpower ambitions; both locked in the same playground = conflict. This does not mean violent tank-to-tank, destroyer-to-destroyer, nuke-to-nuke conflict is guaranteed, but that it, along with economic, political, social, cultural, ideological battles are indeed very likely to occur. Just in the past couple months the wounded United States and surging Middle Kingdom have spared over currency, multi-national corporations, North Korea’s nukes, Tibet, global warming, cyber attacks, and I feel that these will get worse and others will arise as time moves forward. American relations with its many allies in East and South Asia (South Korea, Japan, Australia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Singapore, India) will be shaped by these states’ evolving relations with the burgeoning neighbor. The Chinese government has shown itself to be pragmatic to the core, but its growing resources and influence, are expanding what it sees as its interests further and further abroad. As this occurs, Beijing and Washington’s interests will inevitably collide (case in point). Major conflicts between the US and China are far from preordained, but as of right now I do strongly believe that a rising China is the greatest threat to US interests and homeland.

The current American administration is aware of these challenges facing the country and it would be interesting to see how some of the higher ups (Obama, Clinton, Gates, Mullen, Petraeus) would answer this survey. What do you think they would be? What are your top 7 or more for the US? I will make a new list from the vantage point of threats facing international security very soon.

The triangular relationship between the United States-Iran-Afghanistan has been under analyzed for such a strategically important three-way.  Afghanistan and Iran are neighbors, each with major security issues, and the United States is obviously strategically and physically involved in Afghanistan and we all know the 30 odd years feud between Iran and the US, with Tehran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and regional dominance putting further strains on the relationship.  These three states’ interests overlap and conflict to varying degrees and they need to be explored.

It is too often assumed that Iran and United States share only congruent interests in the Afghanistan conflict.  It is true that Tehran and Washington both desire a stable Afghan state, prevention of the return of the Taliban to power, the elimination of the drug trafficking, and the defeat of Al Qaeda and the two sides have worked together, mainly behind the scenes, toward promoting these goals, but conflicts of interests persist.  As much as Iran, and Russia as well for that matter, desires a stable Afghan state, Tehran desperately would like to avoid a Kabul government implicitly or explicitly allied with the United States.  Tehran would like a pliable Afghan state that it could exploit and as long as the United States is physically and diplomatically tied to Afghanistan, this cannot happen.  Therefore, one should not be surprised to read reports that Iranian elements are aiding certain insurgent groups, including the Taliban, inside of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

US intelligence agencies have officially stated that Iran has ‘covertly supplied arms to Afghan insurgents while publicly posing as supportive of the Afghan government’.  The report released by the office of US Director of National Intelligence also stated that ‘Iran’s policy calculation in Afghanistan currently emphasizes lethal support to the Taliban, even though revelation of this activity could threaten its future relationship with the Afghan government and its historic allies within Afghanistan.’  There have been past reports that asserted that the government in Tehran was supplying weapons to certain Afghan insurgent groups as well.  We must also remember that this is the intelligence that the US deems releasable and that the real extent of Iran’s activity in Afghanistan is unknown.

The reasons for Iran’s covert help to the Afghan insurgency are no doubt complex and can probably never be fully known, but I feel the main reason has to be the disruption of the solidification of a strong, Pro-American Afghan state.  Iran is already hard at work fomenting a Shia-dominated Iraq that will at worst be a non-threat to Iran’s western border and at best a patron and gateway into Middle Eastern dominance.  And therefore we should assume they are trying for a similar outcome in Afghanistan, with the gateway toward Central Asia, Pakistan, and China instead of course.

Another factor that needs to be addressed in this geopolitical three-way is the presence of Iran’s nuclear program.  For the United States’ Obama administration the Afghan conflict and Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons are two of its key foreign policy challenges and surprisingly they are connected in various ways.  Scholar Marc Lynch (a big Obama supporter) laments the lack of such strategic analysis and discussion by academics and Obama administration officials on this key intertwining issue.  After listening to a presentation by Obama’s Afghanistan policy team, led by envoy Richard Holbrooke, Lynch found much wanting.  He raised these ‘crucial strategic’ questions as ones yet to be addressed by the US Afghan team:

How is Holbrooke’s team coordinating with the administration’s Iran policy makers (presumably but not transparently led by Dennis Ross)?  How will the administration assess the tradeoffs between pressuring Iran on the nuclear issue and seeking its assistance in Afghanistan, as both issues come to a head over the coming months?  Which will give if a choice must be made?  Obama’s foreign policy has always been characterized by a strong recognition of the inter-related nature of the various regional challenges — so how do the parts here, in these two vital theaters, fit together?

Great questions for which the answers will be hard to come by; for me and the Obama administration.  Nevertheless, these are questions that need to be thought through and answered as quickly as possible.  In terms of the question regarding tradeoffs between the American Afghan policy and its pressure on Iran to stop its nuclear weapons’ program, I have to believe the Obama administration will attempt to keep these as separate as possible, and don’t myself see this specific connection having a major impact, that is I don’t see any concessions the US could give to Tehran in terms of its position in Afghanistan that would cause them to give up their pursuit of nukes.  Lynch’s last question, regarding the interconnection of various regional challenges with Afghan-Iran-US at the forefront, is the most general, but most needed, as I stated in the beginning, this geopolitical triangular relationship needs more exploration and attention.

Before the Iranian election, I didn’t think much would come about, that is ‘change’.  Ayatollah Khameinei and his self appointed Guardian Council hand pick the candidates knowing that they will be the ones in charge no matter what.  If this is the case, than maybe Ahmadinejad or Mir-Hossein Mousavi may have different temperaments and rhetoric, but the policies they would follow, or be forced to follow, would pretty much be the same.  This feeling continued after Ahmadinejad was declared the winner and protests started to occur.  However, the ongoing protests and outward cries of injustice by Mousavi have started to erode this pliant feeling of mine that no change is on the horizon.  It is difficult to see a picture like this and not feel that things are different in Tehran.

These recent events are starting to make it look that the Ayatollahs may not have the power we thought they did.  Why is Mousavi able to speak out and rile up the populace?  Why would they pick someone who may even have a chance of causing these problems for their theocratic system and rule?  Ayatollah Khameinei’s statement that certain election results will be looked into contradicts his earlier declaration that Ahmadinejad won by a landslide.  Khameinei seems to be bowing to democratic political pressure to show that the election was legitimate.  This change of policy is a serious sign that Khameinei fears that these protests may get out of hand unless something is done, but by doing such a move he opens the regime up to further inquiry and questioning.  I mean Ahmadinejad reportedly won by nearly 20%, how could that possibly be mistaken?  Autocrats are always careful not to open the political/social door, for they know not what will be let in or let out, and it appears the Islamic Republic is starting to creak that door open right now.

That being said, I still feel pessimistically about how this will turn out.  It is true that though there are thousands upset with the election results, mainly in Tehran and other urban areas, there are also millions of other Iranian citizens who are either supportive or compliant to the election results.  As Robert Baer asserts, though the election was probably rigged, Ahmadinejad did likely garner the most votes.  In all likelihood, things will settle down and Ahmadinejad will remain president, though he will not have the political capital afforded most reelected leaders.

Regarding President Obama and his administration’s reaction so far, I would say they are putting forth their strongest strand of realist policy and thinking.  Though there has been statements of ‘concern’ the administration has made it clear that they are taking a ‘hands off’ approach to this conflict.  In other words, it is Iran’s election and the US favors no particular outcome.  Not only does this follow the realist line that sovereignty and respect for other state’s internal workings trump the spread of democracy, but one can argue that Obama just wants some one to negotiate with and it really doesn’t matter whether it be Ahmadinejad, Mousavi, Khameinei, or a Persian Thomas Jefferson.  In fact, one could argue that Ahmadinejad would be easier to negotiate with than Mousavi, as we know where Ahmadinejad stands on the nuclear situation, and though Mousavi in all likelihood would carry out the same policy, his ‘reform’ and ‘softer’ image would make it very difficult to get all on aboard when the situation becomes inevitably tense and serious moves (aka heavy sanctions or military action) may need to be taken.  It appears that Obama seeks a negotiating partner not a democratic spring in Iran, though of course I believe he would welcome such an occurrence, I just don’t think he’s A. expecting it, B. thinks it will make the future negotiating easier.  Remember, Obama went out of his way to acknowledge the Islamic Republic leadership in his television address to the country, becoming the first US administration to officially speak of or to the Regime.  By doing this, he is taking a gambit that by only dealing with the government in power can negotiations and rapprochement have a chance at succeeding.  The administration obviously did not think the Regime would be challenged during the upcoming election, but by Obama’s reserved reaction, it appears the administration is sticking with the game plan.

(Photo: New York Times)

For Diplomacy to work it takes two sides, an important concept that too many forget. President Obama reached out to the Iranian people and leadership yesterday in a message calling for ‘new beginnings’. Unfortunately, the message brought back some of the same old, same old from the Iranian leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, who called this proposed change ‘insulting’ and unsubstantial. First here’s the meat of Obama’s speech:

So in this season of new beginnings I would like to speak clearly to Iran’s leaders. We have serious differences that have grown over time. My administration is now committed to diplomacy that addresses the full range of issues before us, and to pursuing constructive ties among the United States, Iran and the international community. This process will not be advanced by threats. We seek instead engagement that is honest and grounded in mutual respect.

And Khamenei’s reaction:

”He (Obama) insulted the Islamic Republic of Iran from the first day. If you are right that change has come, where is that change? What is the sign of that change? Make it clear for us what has changed.”

So it appears as Obama’s throwing softballs, Iran’s Islamic Republic is coming back with hardball.  This just exemplifies how much has to go right for US-Iranian relations to improve in any strategic way.  One could argue that in fact a real rapprochement may be impossible as the nature of the two regimes are in complete contrast to the other.  Continuing that domestic politics thread is the argument that the Islamic Republic’s livelihood depends on having an American and Israeli enemy; Little and Great Satan.

Even with the unwelcome reply by the Ayatollah this move could pay dividends in the long term, of course by that time the Tehran could have nukes.  This move by Obama, though providing no concrete carrots or sticks, does put his and the US’s head out there for an opening and though I’m skeptical, it could lead to an easier opening at a later time.  Of course former President Bush made several speeches directly targeted at the Iranian people, including this one at the UN, to little avail.

So some think this move by Obama as strong, others as weak: What do you think?  Is this a solid first step in smoothing relations or just a superficial attempt which will fail to alter the longstanding feud?

I listened (and kinda watched) Robert Baer’s presentation in front of the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco, found below. Baer, a former CIA agent and author of ‘The Devil We Know: Dealing with the New Iranian Superpower‘, is an astute and seasoned veteran of US-Iran relations. He is a strong believer that the US must look past President Ahmadinejad’s erratic behavior and focus on the real center of Iran’s power, Ayatollah Khamenei, who he sees as a rational political being. Baer extends his argument by asserting that the Shia of the Middle East are overall more predictable and rational than their Sunni brethren. In any case, the main point from Baer is that the US can and should negotiate the Iranian state.

The debate over whether the Islamic Republic of Iran is a rational state like all others in the international system is an important one with obvious implications. I have covered the issue at least twice in my academic career, writing a paper that argued Iran should be considered a normal state (Iran: Welcome to the Nuclear Family), and one that argues the opposite (Iran’s Continuous Revolution). In the first paper, I argued that a nuclear armed Iran would act rationally like other states armed with such a destructive weapon, cautiously. The second paper argued that ever since the 1979 Islamic-controlled revolution the state has been led by leaders who have in many ways gone against international norms and followed irrational foreign policies.

I think Bush looked at the Iranian regime the way my second paper did, as a state that would not follow the rules and couldn’t be dealt with directly. Judging by Obama’s early rhetoric and call for direct negotiations, one has to think he believes the country’s leaders are rational and in turn can be diplomatic partners. Though contrary to most accounts, the Bush administration did at times ‘talk’ with Iranian counterparts, but usually only on low levels. The past administration also joined the Europeans in making the Iranian state several decent offers to stop enriching uranium, but without success or really even any signs of progress. Obama has led one to believe he will take a more forward approach to the Iranian regime, but exactly how still remains to be seen. I doubt Obama himself will head to Tehran any time soon, but one can see him sending Sec of State Clinton to meet with Iran’s equally prominent Foreign Minister at a neutral site in Europe some where.

The Obama administration’s progress in terms of US-Iran negotiations (besides the nuclear issue, Iran is an important player in Afghanistan and Iraq’s present and future) will largely depend on reciprocal diplomatic advancements from the Ayatollah, and that is where the previous argument comes back into play. What drives Ayatollah Khamenei and his partners? Do they seek to spread their version of Shia Islam across the Middle East, destroy Israel, and battle the ‘Great Satan’ United States as long it exists? Or is the state just following pragmatic policies that strengthen it at home and abroad?

Continuing yesterday’s thread on the Bush Administration’s ‘No’ to Israel regarding an air attack on Iran’s nuclear program, let’s look at why the the US government made the decision they did. First off, how threatening does the Bush administration believe a nuclear-armed Iran is? I think there is no doubt that Bush and his advisers view the Islamic Republic of Iran as a serious threat to regional stability and US regional dominance. Though I am not quite as concerned about an Iranian bomb, I think they would likely be rather rational and cautious, though more powerful and influential overall, I think Bush fears them to a much greater degree.

"Good job nuclear scientist guys!"

So therefore I believe Bush very much wants to stop Iran from obtaining nuclear capability, but why would he therefore give the Israeli’s the stop sign? I think the main reason has to be that it might create a situation of great instability in Iraq, where the US is trying to organize a withdrawal and the continued progress of a stable and somewhat democratic Iraqi state. If Israel attacked the Iranian nuclear system, using Iraqi airspace, there is a likely chance that the Iraqi government would put even more pressure on the US military to leave the country, arguing that they were undermining Iraqi sovereignty. Iran’s retaliatory measures might also destabilize the fragile Iraqi society and government as Muqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi militia have strong connections the Iranian government and could create havoc in Baghdad and countryside as well as remove their political parties in government, creating a crisis of legitimacy and stalemating further legislation. So I think Iraqi stability took precedence over militarily taking out/or slowing an Iranian Bomb in this case.

Another rather obvious reason for Bush’s ‘No’ was the lack of evidence that the Israelis could really halt the Iranian nuclear weapon project by more than a year or so. According to the New York Times, Israel was planning on hitting the Natanz site, the most well-known Iranian nuclear facility, and other targets were also chosen, but there was not much information about them. The Bush administration probably reasoned that the probability of the strike doing major damage to the Iranian program was not worth the risk of the attack’s retaliatory consequences.

Looking at the Israeli-led strike occurring in today’s strategic environment, with Israel knee-deep in Gaza, seems even less likely. Though I do not think Israel’s air force is tied down enough to make this impossible. Lastly, I think another reason for Bush’s ‘No’ to Israel and apparent ‘No’ to a US-led operation also has to do with a sense that the incoming Obama administration may be tougher on Iran than previously thought. As Hirsch and others have predicted, Bush would military act on Iran because he felt an incoming administration would not have his will or political protection to do so.

I couldn't resist!

Why do you think Bush said ‘No’?  And should he have said ‘Yes‘?