Iran's Revolutionary Guard

It’s not exactly yellow cake, but the Wall Street Journal reported yesterday that the US Treasury Department accused Iran of aiding and partnering with Al Qaeda:

The U.S. for the first time formally accused Iran of forging an agreement with al Qaeda, helping operatives move money, arms and fighters through Iranian territory to the terrorist group’s bases in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The U.S. Treasury Department outlined on Thursday what it said was an extensive fund-raising operation devised by al Qaeda that utilizes Iran-based operatives and draws from donors in oil-rich Persian Gulf countries such as Kuwait and Qatar.

The story needs more flesh, but this is still pretty alarming. The American public has been told for years that Iran did not have a partnership with Al Qaeda and in fact likely viewed the transnational terrorist group as an enemy (Shia – Sunni battle), but this evidence shows otherwise. It would be one thing if Al Qaeda just had operatives in Iran, but the Treasury Department said:

.. it had sanctioned six al Qaeda members for allegedly overseeing this network. The network’s head, Syrian-national Ezedin Abdul Aziz Khalil, is based in Iran and has been operating there under an agreement with Iranian authorities since 2005, according to senior U.S. officials.

The key part is ‘under an agreement with Iranian authorities’. Like I said before, there is much more that needs to be fleshed out of this connection before we can fully accuse top Iranian leaders of aiding and abetting America’s number one enemy, but if ever the Obama administration needed a ‘smoking gun’ to rally public opinion and pressure the Islamic Republic, this is it.

Over the weekend, the Wall Street Journal published this fascinating piece on the rising, so far just cold, conflict between Sunni-led Saudi Arabia and Shia-led Iran. Now these two regional powers have been in competition since the fall of the Shah in Iran in 1979, but as the article by Bill Spindle and Margaret Coker describes, the Arab Spring, particularly with the fall of Saudi Arabia’s Sunni partner, Mubarak in Egypt, things have gotten more heated. The intriguing situation in Bahrain, where the Shia majority is in revolt against the minority Sunni leadership, is a flashpoint in this so-called new cold war. As some of you may have heard, Saudi Arabia sent in troops to put down the insurrection and just announced yesterday that those troops aren’t going anywhere. This will definitely be a story to follow.

Here is the lead in to Spindle and Coker’s worthwhile analysis:

For three months, the Arab world has been awash in protests and demonstrations. It’s being called an Arab Spring, harking back to the Prague Spring of 1968.

But comparison to the short-lived flowering of protests 40 years ago in Czechoslovakia is turning out to be apt in another way. For all the attention the Mideast protests have received, their most notable impact on the region thus far hasn’t been an upswell of democracy. It has been a dramatic spike in tensions between two geopolitical titans, Iran and Saudi Arabia.

This new Middle East cold war comes complete with its own spy-versus-spy intrigues, disinformation campaigns, shadowy proxy forces, supercharged state rhetoric—and very high stakes.

“The cold war is a reality,” says one senior Saudi official. “Iran is looking to expand its influence. This instability over the last few months means that we don’t have the luxury of sitting back and watching events unfold.”

On March 14, the Saudis rolled tanks and troops across a causeway into the island kingdom of Bahrain. The ruling family there, long a close Saudi ally, appealed for assistance in dealing with increasingly large protests.

Director of National Intelligence James Clapper has taken a lot of heat for his performance and statements in the last few months, much of it deserved. His ignorance regarding a substantial terrorist plot an entire day after arrests were made in London is inexcusable and his claim that the Muslim Brotherhood was a ‘largely secular’ group was laughable. However, the latest flap regarding comments made by Mr. Clapper have been wrongly criticized by members of Congress and the media. Cue the newstory:

During an appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on worldwide threats, Sen. Joe Manchin, D-W.Va., asked Clapper which country posed the greatest threat to the United States.

“Certainly, the Russians still have a very formidable nuclear arsenal, which does pose potentially a mortal threat to us,” Clapper said. “I don’t think they have the intent to do that.”

He added that China “is growing in its military capabilities. It has a full array of, whether conventional or strategic forces, that they are building. So they too do pose, potentially from a capabilities standpoint, a threat to us as a mortal threat.”

Committee chairman Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich., told Clapper he was surprised by his answer that Russia and China posed the greatest mortal threat and gave him an opportunity to clarify whether Iran or North Korea might be more of a threat.

Clapper said he based his assessment strictly on the strategic nuclear capabilities of nation-states that have the potential to be mortal dangers to the U.S. and, “the two that come to mind because of their capabilities are Russia and China.”

Though Iran and North Korea were “of great concern,” he said, they do not pose a threat to the continental United States.

Senator Manchin rephrased his question to ask which country had the intent to be our greatest adversary.

Clapper replied, “Probably China.”

The Senators mentioned along with others spoke up to the media after the hearing again to voice their disagreement with Clapper’s claim that Russia and China are more of a ‘mortal threat’ to US national security than say, Iran or North Korea. I think Clapper is totally accurate with his assertions. Indeed, China and Russia are indeed more existentially threatening to US national security and our American way of life. I back this up clearly in my Great Power Rankings.

Surely, a nuclear North Korea and aspiring nuclear power Iran, are menacing and a great nuisance to their neighbors, US allies, and the US interests, but they cannot mortally harm the United States. They should be classified as ‘enemies’ of our country, but not ‘mortal threats’. China on the other hand is a bona fide great power that is still growing. It’s economy is not 2^nd to the United States, it’s military is growing rapidly (especially its Navy), and it has substantial regional, if not international, aspirations to be a revisionist power. Russia has a thousands of nuclear warheads, holds many conflicting areas of interest with the US, and has been antagonistic toward America numerous times.

Does this mean that China and Russia are enemies or that North Korea and Iran do not pose a threat to our interests? Of course not, Mr. Rhetorical. We just need to be aware that there are difference level of threats out there. Mr. Clapper may not be fit to hold his position atop our nation’s intelligence network, but he is right in this assessment.

For a majority of President Obama’s 2nd State of the Union address foreign affairs were only brought up in relation to domestic economic or social issues. For instance, the US was ‘falling behind’ South Korea in education and Europe in infrastructure… The focus on domestic issues should not be a surprise as Obama has already stated that ‘the country he’s most interested in building is our own’ and the United States is still struggling economically and psychologically with many Americans seeing a bleak future for our coming generations. Alas, there are foreign monsters abroad that need to be addressed by our Commander and Chief and Obama curtly discussed the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, Al Qaeda, and even Tunisia. I’ll make a few observations of these topics with Afghanistan at the end: (The near entirety of the SOTU’s foreign affairs section is found at the bottom of the post)

• Iran and North Korea: Here is the President’s statement on those two destabilizing forces in international security:

Because of a diplomatic effort to insist that Iran meet its obligations, the Iranian government now faces tougher and tighter sanctions than ever before. And on the Korean peninsula, we stand with our ally South Korea, and insist that North Korea keeps its commitment to abandon nuclear weapons.

Yes, that’s it. If you want to scroll lower to the entire foreign policy section you can see a paragraph on Sudan that is longer. So in a speech dominated by domestic policy, we see a nuclear state that in the past year twice militarily attacked its southern neighbor, strong US ally South Korea, and another state nestled in the volatile Middle East that just turned down yet another Western attempt to disclose its nuclear capabilities and desires, get two sentences. Words in a speech do not define effective policy, but if you were Iran or North Korea, wouldn’t this signal to you that you are not one of the United States’ main concerns?

• Iraq: Though I’ve read some conservative pundits critique the President for washing his hands of the conflict or for taking credit for the Bush administration’s surge and SOFA policies, I thought Obama did a good enough job discussing a topic that he nor the country probably wanted to talk about. Though the word ‘civilian’ is inaccurate (we still have  a strong military presence in the country),  Obama made a necessary statement in regards to our logn term commitment to the future of Iraq; ‘our civilians will forge a lasting partnership with the Iraqi people.’

• Afghanistan: The Afghan war, where over 100,000 American troops are currently engaged, received twice the time as Iran and North Korea…that’s right not one short paragraph, but two! (Highlighted below) Nothing really new was said. President Obama did state that our main reason for the war was to keep the Taliban from gaining a ‘stronghold’ where they could assist Al Qaeda in launching attacks on the US. If one takes this to heart, it is hard to imagine the administration being too lenient on negotiations with members of the Taliban, but they have shown many other signs that this is likely to occur. In this vein, the President also said that we will start to bring troops home in July, bringing back the fading July 2011 drawdown date that we haven’t heard much of lately. Does this mean that tens of thousands of American troops will be coming home in July? I still don’t think so, but a more than token amount will.
• China: The Middle Kingdom was mentioned twice, both times in reference to the American education/innovation/economy. The US was shown to be behind in both comparisons.

The Afghanistan and whole foreign policy section seemed to me like the President was checking boxes. It appears that those who predicted he would pivot to foreign affairs after the midterm defeat were wrong.

He’s a great interpretation of President Obama’s foreign affairs SOTU pronouncements by The Cable’s Josh Rogin:

Foreign Policy section the SOTU:

Just as jobs and businesses can now race across borders, so can new threats and new challenges. No single wall separates East and West; no one rival superpower is aligned against us.

And so we must defeat determined enemies wherever they are, and build coalitions that cut across lines of region and race and religion. America’s moral example must always shine for all who yearn for freedom, justice, and dignity. And because we have begun this work, tonight we can say that American leadership has been renewed and America’s standing has been restored.

Look to Iraq, where nearly 100,000 of our brave men and women have left with their heads held high; where American combat patrols have ended; violence has come down; and a new government has been formed. This year, our civilians will forge a lasting partnership with the Iraqi people, while we finish the job of bringing our troops out of Iraq. America’s commitment has been kept; the Iraq War is coming to an end.

Of course, as we speak, al Qaeda and their affiliates continue to plan attacks against us. Thanks to our intelligence and law enforcement professionals, we are disrupting plots and securing our cities and skies. And as extremists try to inspire acts of violence within our borders, we are responding with the strength of our communities, with respect for the rule of law, and with the conviction that American Muslims are a part of our American family.

We have also taken the fight to al Qaeda and their allies abroad. In Afghanistan, our troops have taken Taliban strongholds and trained Afghan Security Forces. Our purpose is clear – by preventing the Taliban from reestablishing a stranglehold over the Afghan people, we will deny al Qaeda the safe-haven that served as a launching pad for 9/11.

Thanks to our heroic troops and civilians, fewer Afghans are under the control of the insurgency. There will be tough fighting ahead, and the Afghan government will need to deliver better governance. But we are strengthening the capacity of the Afghan people and building an enduring partnership with them. This year, we will work with nearly 50 countries to begin a transition to an Afghan lead. And this July, we will begin to bring our troops home.

In Pakistan, al Qaeda’s leadership is under more pressure than at any point since 2001. Their leaders and operatives are being removed from the battlefield. Their safe-havens are shrinking. And we have sent a message from the Afghan border to the Arabian Peninsula to all parts of the globe: we will not relent, we will not waver, and we will defeat you.

American leadership can also be seen in the effort to secure the worst weapons of war. Because Republicans and Democrats approved the New START Treaty, far fewer nuclear weapons and launchers will be deployed. Because we rallied the world, nuclear materials are being locked down on every continent so they never fall into the hands of terrorists.

Because of a diplomatic effort to insist that Iran meet its obligations, the Iranian government now faces tougher and tighter sanctions than ever before. And on the Korean peninsula, we stand with our ally South Korea, and insist that North Korea keeps its commitment to abandon nuclear weapons.

This is just a part of how we are shaping a world that favors peace and prosperity. With our European allies, we revitalized NATO, and increased our cooperation on everything from counter-terrorism to missile defense. We have reset our relationship with Russia, strengthened Asian alliances, and built new partnerships with nations like India. This March, I will travel to Brazil, Chile, and El Salvador to forge new alliances for progress in the Americas. Around the globe, we are standing with those who take responsibility – helping farmers grow more food; supporting doctors who care for the sick; and combating the corruption that can rot a society and rob people of opportunity.

Recent events have shown us that what sets us apart must not just be our power – it must be the purpose behind it. In South Sudan – with our assistance – the people were finally able to vote for independence after years of war. Thousands lined up before dawn. People danced in the streets. One man who lost four of his brothers at war summed up the scene around him: “This was a battlefield for most of my life. Now we want to be free.”

We saw that same desire to be free in Tunisia, where the will of the people proved more powerful than the writ of a dictator. And tonight, let us be clear: the United States of America stands with the people of Tunisia, and supports the democratic aspirations of all people.

The events in Iran are number one story in the United States; above health care, budget deficits, Arod, and even the Jonas Brothers. Many Americans from all political and social backgrounds are calling for something to be done to help the Iranian protestors, with many watching and critiquing President Obama’s statements and actions. Why? Don’t Americans have enough to worry about here at home with a struggling economy, major energy and health policies on the horizon, a North Korea talking about launching a missile toward Hawaii?

In this country it’s just assumed that we care about other people’s rights and freedoms, because, well, we generally do. I believe a portion of these kinds of sentiment come from the fact that many Americans have to time to spend on such faraway and seemingly distant problems and issues because our wealth affords them this. I loved to point out to my students that many other people would love to gather at conferences to discuss ways to solve the world’s problems (civil war, poverty, hunger), but they don’t have the time because their actually stuck dealing with them! But the abundance of media and civic attention spent so far on the Iranian protests show a nation more deeply involved in the plight of other humans fighting what most Americans consider universal rights. Wilsonian America is standing up and putting pressure on our politicians to support the spread of democracy and human rights and by Obama’s comments today and resolutions passed by Congress, the pols are listening.

Changing threads: Is Iran going to have a full fledged revolution with a regime change? This is obviously an important question and one that puts political scientists to the test. There are many theories by major scholars such as Stephen Walt, Fred Halliday, David Armstrong, and Theda Skocpol, that attempt to predict/explain revolutions in the international relations field, but I have yet to see a brave soul put a prediction regarding the current events happening in Iran. These theories stress such casual factors in revolutions as economic class, weakness or strength of institutions, international norms, civil society, army, individual actors, just to name a few.

I, myself, am not smart or arrogant enough to attempt to predict the fall or sustainability of the Islamic Republic, but I am definitely leaning one way and for a very good reason. The key questions I think one should ask to find out the answer to this question is…Who controls the army and does the army view the current government as legitimate? For it is true that part of the reason the Islamic Republic came to power in the first place is because the Shah lost his previously strong hold on the military. By the military’s willingness so far to attempt to contain/stop the protests and by reading these reports, I have to believe that the Islamic Republic still maintains this vital area of support and this I would predict likely keep them in power for at least a while longer. The Revolutionary Guards seem ready and willing to stop any attack on the regime and I’m not sure if the rising tide of civil society is strong enough to combat this force, history tells us it usually is not. In the next few days/weeks, I suggest paying special attention to actions of Iran’s military.

One last thought on the causes of a possible revolution and protests.  We have heard many reasons why thousands of Iranian citizens all of a sudden rose up against the Islamic Republic Regime, but one that I have not really heard much about is the fact that their neighbor Iraq had true democratic elections just a few months before Iran’s Presidential election.  Only this story in the Christian Science Monitor connects the two country’s elections, and it mainly does so by comparing their respective Ayatollah clerical system.  I don’t think the Iraqi elections had a major impact on the Iranian protests, but I think that to discount its possible effects would be mistaken.  How could it not have an impact?  A country, with which you share thousands of years of history, religion, and land, goes through a dramatic change, including in the political process, and it is impossible to ignore.  Iranians saw a lot of destruction and instability happening to their neighbor, but they also saw nearby people vote and elect fellow citizens to represent them.  That has to mean something.

Before the Iranian election, I didn’t think much would come about, that is ‘change’.  Ayatollah Khameinei and his self appointed Guardian Council hand pick the candidates knowing that they will be the ones in charge no matter what.  If this is the case, than maybe Ahmadinejad or Mir-Hossein Mousavi may have different temperaments and rhetoric, but the policies they would follow, or be forced to follow, would pretty much be the same.  This feeling continued after Ahmadinejad was declared the winner and protests started to occur.  However, the ongoing protests and outward cries of injustice by Mousavi have started to erode this pliant feeling of mine that no change is on the horizon.  It is difficult to see a picture like this and not feel that things are different in Tehran.

These recent events are starting to make it look that the Ayatollahs may not have the power we thought they did.  Why is Mousavi able to speak out and rile up the populace?  Why would they pick someone who may even have a chance of causing these problems for their theocratic system and rule?  Ayatollah Khameinei’s statement that certain election results will be looked into contradicts his earlier declaration that Ahmadinejad won by a landslide.  Khameinei seems to be bowing to democratic political pressure to show that the election was legitimate.  This change of policy is a serious sign that Khameinei fears that these protests may get out of hand unless something is done, but by doing such a move he opens the regime up to further inquiry and questioning.  I mean Ahmadinejad reportedly won by nearly 20%, how could that possibly be mistaken?  Autocrats are always careful not to open the political/social door, for they know not what will be let in or let out, and it appears the Islamic Republic is starting to creak that door open right now.

That being said, I still feel pessimistically about how this will turn out.  It is true that though there are thousands upset with the election results, mainly in Tehran and other urban areas, there are also millions of other Iranian citizens who are either supportive or compliant to the election results.  As Robert Baer asserts, though the election was probably rigged, Ahmadinejad did likely garner the most votes.  In all likelihood, things will settle down and Ahmadinejad will remain president, though he will not have the political capital afforded most reelected leaders.

Regarding President Obama and his administration’s reaction so far, I would say they are putting forth their strongest strand of realist policy and thinking.  Though there has been statements of ‘concern’ the administration has made it clear that they are taking a ‘hands off’ approach to this conflict.  In other words, it is Iran’s election and the US favors no particular outcome.  Not only does this follow the realist line that sovereignty and respect for other state’s internal workings trump the spread of democracy, but one can argue that Obama just wants some one to negotiate with and it really doesn’t matter whether it be Ahmadinejad, Mousavi, Khameinei, or a Persian Thomas Jefferson.  In fact, one could argue that Ahmadinejad would be easier to negotiate with than Mousavi, as we know where Ahmadinejad stands on the nuclear situation, and though Mousavi in all likelihood would carry out the same policy, his ‘reform’ and ‘softer’ image would make it very difficult to get all on aboard when the situation becomes inevitably tense and serious moves (aka heavy sanctions or military action) may need to be taken.  It appears that Obama seeks a negotiating partner not a democratic spring in Iran, though of course I believe he would welcome such an occurrence, I just don’t think he’s A. expecting it, B. thinks it will make the future negotiating easier.  Remember, Obama went out of his way to acknowledge the Islamic Republic leadership in his television address to the country, becoming the first US administration to officially speak of or to the Regime.  By doing this, he is taking a gambit that by only dealing with the government in power can negotiations and rapprochement have a chance at succeeding.  The administration obviously did not think the Regime would be challenged during the upcoming election, but by Obama’s reserved reaction, it appears the administration is sticking with the game plan.

(Photo: New York Times)

Rashid, a highly touted Pakistani journalist, begins the final chapter of his 2000 ‘Taliban’ by calling the country one of world’s ‘orphaned conflict’s’.  The country would quickly change from being orphaned to a month after 9/11 being the center of global politics, as the United States uprooted the Taliban government and sent them packing, unfortunately for only a short-term vacation.

Rashid’s valuable book walks its readers through a rather dense social, religious, military, and even psychological history of the group of radicalized Pashtuns, known as the Taliban.  He provides a solid regional historical overview and does not forget the many geopolitical actors involved in the fragmented country (Iran, Turkmenistan, Saudi Arabia, etc.).  A solid half of the book details the violent rise to power of the Taliban as they battled first fellow Pashtun groups, than the government in Kabul, and finally the Northern Alliance actors, which would never relinquish their autonomy to Taliban-ruled Kabul and Kandahar.  This book is worth reading just for those who don’t know just how fractious the Afghan society can be with many various ethnicities and sects, all with foreign partners, that have had to violently attempt to protect themselves and further their own people’s positions.  This book, just like Afghanistan today, is full of conflict and violence that shows no real sign of ebbing.

Rashid provides a telling description of the early members of the Taliban (around 1994) as Afghans born in Pakistan and raised mainly by madrassas as their parents, especially mothers, may have been lost in the years of fighting during and after the Soviet invasion and withdrawal.  These young men had ‘no memories of the past, no plans for the future’ and knew of nothing else but their Taliban leaders.  Like we have heard many times in reference to terrorist and gang groups, the Taliban offered these men, and boys, a meaning to their lives that they could embrace and fight for.

This type of camaraderie of course becomes dangerous when it is based on ignorant, stubborn, violent, yet a strong ideology and form of Islam, as they, the Taliban, surely had.  The Taliban, which by 1996 controlled large swaths of Afghan territory, including Kabul, ruled with a fundamental Islamic iron fist that showed no accommodation, not even towards UN aid providers.  The Taliban was controlling a large population and recruiting members with a version of Islam that ‘divested’ it of nearly all of its positive legacies, including Islamic philosophy, science, arts, civil society, etc.  It was the Taliban’s way or the knife.  One has never read about a more oppressive society.

The Taliban did not become the Taliban, or rule, in a vacuum.  They were of course incubated and constantly nourished by the Pakistani government and ISI.  When the Taliban needed more troops in their battles with Masud and what would become the Northern Alliance, Pakistan would just close some of their madrassas in FATA or the Northwest Provinces and send the men over the border.  Rashid, who also spends time on Osama bin Ladin’s terrorist network in Afghanistan, accurately predicted that the Pakistani state and military were creating their own nightmare with their support of the Taliban, instead of the ‘strategic depth’ they aimed for.  The author stated that the Islamic fundamentalism, drugs, weapons, and social breakdown that the Pakistani government was assisting the Taliban in performing or using, was making Islamabad ‘ripe for a Taliban-style Islamic revolution.’  While what is occurring today in Pakistan is so far, thankfully, not this extreme, it is too close for comfort.

Rashid’s ‘Taliban’ also details the human and women right’s abuses by the Taliban in great detail.  In addition, Rashid spends several chapters describing the ‘great game’ of pipeline politics in the Central Asia region and not surprisingly was correct in his assessment that Afghanistan, and the region as a whole, was just too unstable for Western groups to come in and build major gas and oil pipelines, no matter how much they wanted too.  Though these pipeline chapters were well researched, they can be passed over by most readers.

Rashid’s book provides much more than the history and make-up of a group that the powerful United States military is having a hell of a time defeating, it brings to life the challenging modern history of a people who have only known violence in their lives.  It is sad to think that one cannot imagine this changing in the near or even long-term future.  Though Rashid’s work is far from perfect, too many assumptions presented as facts (he is a journalist by trade), it brings light on a dangerous and important group, geopolitical actors and actions in a key region of the world, and on the suffering of millions.

Regarding some of President Obama’s recent foreign policy moves, I have on several occasions thought and written here on GPP, ‘what’s in it for us?’, or ‘How does this concretely help either side?’ Most of this comes from soft power moves of Obama apologizing or distancing himself from American ‘arrogance’ or mistakes. I know state leaders need to play a bit to their foreign audience, but I don’t quite buy the theory that this type of ‘rapprochement’ brings either truly better strategic relationships between allies or makes enemies into partners ready to deal. If the US president was going to disparage the country and let others agenda’s trump our own at times, I would at least like to see some hard results, such as Russia denouncing North Korea’s missile launch (they did the opposite) or truly help out on Iran or maybe some stronger NATO commitment in Afghanistan. Alas, after stating all of this I am willing to give President Obama time. Time to show that all of this is part of larger strategic plan that will pay off dividends for the US and international security.

It is on that positive note that I turn to another topic, where I’m afraid I think Obama’s long-term plan is unfortunately not attainable and therefore his current moves might hurt more than help. I am talking about Obama’s Czech speech, where he laid out his policy towards nuclear weapons. He stated that the US would reduce their nuclear weapon collection, deemphasize their use in military affairs, and lastly that because the US was the only nation to use the weapon, we bare a ‘moral’ responsibility to work toward their elimination.

First off, about the ‘moral’ responsibility part. As horrible as the US use of nuclear weapons against Japan in WWII, I would disagree that it was immoral, in terms of state actions. The US and Japan were losing thousands of soldiers in the fighting around Japan, with Japan also losing thousands of civilians by Allied bombing of their cities on a daily basis, and the US calculated that they needed to end the war as soon as possible and utilized their most effective/destructive weapon to do so. This move caused untold human destruction, but it also saved thousands of other Japanese and American lives and ended the bloodiest war known to mankind. Since the wars end, the US and Japan have also had a strategic, friendly, and prosperous relationship. The US does indeed carry with it a burden of the weapons’ use, but I would argue against America still having any ‘moral responsibility’ for it use during what was an extraordinary moment in world history.

Alright, back to the speeches main points: A world without nukes sounds wonderful, but it is not realistic nor I think an area where Obama should be spending his global political capital. In his speech, Obama alluded that if the US showed it was willing to lessen its support of nuclear weapons, all other states, especially rogue ones, would feel less threatened and it would help the global norm against the weapon as a choice for states. In other words, if the US stopped being nuclear hypocrites other states and regimes would give up their nuclear ambitions. Unfortunately, history tells us otherwise. Did India, Pakistan, Iran, North Korea, South Africa, France, Great Britain, Al Qaeda all pursue nuclear weapons because the US had them? No, they pursued them for their own national strategic interests and defense.

What about the idea of a nuclear free-world? Though it would be very difficult to reach, wouldn’t it be a wonderful thing? Not really. As I have discussed before on GPP, I feel that states would still not trust that the others did not have nuclear weapons and this would create a security dilemma, where states would inevitably try to circumvent or protect themselves from another by obtaining them again! Except we would have to relive the dangerous early part of ‘who has the weapon?’, ‘will they use it?’ This sounds like a scary, unpredictable world to me. I would rather have our current situation where only a few, mostly stable states, hold nuclear weapons and it is well-known who. To have a world with no nukes would require some form of strong world government to verify this outcome and that does not appear on the horizon.

'I thought your speech was very inspirational Mr. Obama'

So once again, I ask about a new US foreign policy stance or maneuver, what does the US or world get out of this policy? Will it cause Iran to come to the negotiating table and actually negotiate instead of buy time? Will it stop North Korea from launching another missile, which may one day carry a nuclear weapon, in six months? Will it end nukes forever in 30 years? How does this policy make the US and world safer?

I listened (and kinda watched) Robert Baer’s presentation in front of the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco, found below. Baer, a former CIA agent and author of ‘The Devil We Know: Dealing with the New Iranian Superpower‘, is an astute and seasoned veteran of US-Iran relations. He is a strong believer that the US must look past President Ahmadinejad’s erratic behavior and focus on the real center of Iran’s power, Ayatollah Khamenei, who he sees as a rational political being. Baer extends his argument by asserting that the Shia of the Middle East are overall more predictable and rational than their Sunni brethren. In any case, the main point from Baer is that the US can and should negotiate the Iranian state.

The debate over whether the Islamic Republic of Iran is a rational state like all others in the international system is an important one with obvious implications. I have covered the issue at least twice in my academic career, writing a paper that argued Iran should be considered a normal state (Iran: Welcome to the Nuclear Family), and one that argues the opposite (Iran’s Continuous Revolution). In the first paper, I argued that a nuclear armed Iran would act rationally like other states armed with such a destructive weapon, cautiously. The second paper argued that ever since the 1979 Islamic-controlled revolution the state has been led by leaders who have in many ways gone against international norms and followed irrational foreign policies.

I think Bush looked at the Iranian regime the way my second paper did, as a state that would not follow the rules and couldn’t be dealt with directly. Judging by Obama’s early rhetoric and call for direct negotiations, one has to think he believes the country’s leaders are rational and in turn can be diplomatic partners. Though contrary to most accounts, the Bush administration did at times ‘talk’ with Iranian counterparts, but usually only on low levels. The past administration also joined the Europeans in making the Iranian state several decent offers to stop enriching uranium, but without success or really even any signs of progress. Obama has led one to believe he will take a more forward approach to the Iranian regime, but exactly how still remains to be seen. I doubt Obama himself will head to Tehran any time soon, but one can see him sending Sec of State Clinton to meet with Iran’s equally prominent Foreign Minister at a neutral site in Europe some where.

The Obama administration’s progress in terms of US-Iran negotiations (besides the nuclear issue, Iran is an important player in Afghanistan and Iraq’s present and future) will largely depend on reciprocal diplomatic advancements from the Ayatollah, and that is where the previous argument comes back into play. What drives Ayatollah Khamenei and his partners? Do they seek to spread their version of Shia Islam across the Middle East, destroy Israel, and battle the ‘Great Satan’ United States as long it exists? Or is the state just following pragmatic policies that strengthen it at home and abroad?