Before the Iranian election, I didn’t think much would come about, that is ‘change’.  Ayatollah Khameinei and his self appointed Guardian Council hand pick the candidates knowing that they will be the ones in charge no matter what.  If this is the case, than maybe Ahmadinejad or Mir-Hossein Mousavi may have different temperaments and rhetoric, but the policies they would follow, or be forced to follow, would pretty much be the same.  This feeling continued after Ahmadinejad was declared the winner and protests started to occur.  However, the ongoing protests and outward cries of injustice by Mousavi have started to erode this pliant feeling of mine that no change is on the horizon.  It is difficult to see a picture like this and not feel that things are different in Tehran.

These recent events are starting to make it look that the Ayatollahs may not have the power we thought they did.  Why is Mousavi able to speak out and rile up the populace?  Why would they pick someone who may even have a chance of causing these problems for their theocratic system and rule?  Ayatollah Khameinei’s statement that certain election results will be looked into contradicts his earlier declaration that Ahmadinejad won by a landslide.  Khameinei seems to be bowing to democratic political pressure to show that the election was legitimate.  This change of policy is a serious sign that Khameinei fears that these protests may get out of hand unless something is done, but by doing such a move he opens the regime up to further inquiry and questioning.  I mean Ahmadinejad reportedly won by nearly 20%, how could that possibly be mistaken?  Autocrats are always careful not to open the political/social door, for they know not what will be let in or let out, and it appears the Islamic Republic is starting to creak that door open right now.

That being said, I still feel pessimistically about how this will turn out.  It is true that though there are thousands upset with the election results, mainly in Tehran and other urban areas, there are also millions of other Iranian citizens who are either supportive or compliant to the election results.  As Robert Baer asserts, though the election was probably rigged, Ahmadinejad did likely garner the most votes.  In all likelihood, things will settle down and Ahmadinejad will remain president, though he will not have the political capital afforded most reelected leaders.

Regarding President Obama and his administration’s reaction so far, I would say they are putting forth their strongest strand of realist policy and thinking.  Though there has been statements of ‘concern’ the administration has made it clear that they are taking a ‘hands off’ approach to this conflict.  In other words, it is Iran’s election and the US favors no particular outcome.  Not only does this follow the realist line that sovereignty and respect for other state’s internal workings trump the spread of democracy, but one can argue that Obama just wants some one to negotiate with and it really doesn’t matter whether it be Ahmadinejad, Mousavi, Khameinei, or a Persian Thomas Jefferson.  In fact, one could argue that Ahmadinejad would be easier to negotiate with than Mousavi, as we know where Ahmadinejad stands on the nuclear situation, and though Mousavi in all likelihood would carry out the same policy, his ‘reform’ and ‘softer’ image would make it very difficult to get all on aboard when the situation becomes inevitably tense and serious moves (aka heavy sanctions or military action) may need to be taken.  It appears that Obama seeks a negotiating partner not a democratic spring in Iran, though of course I believe he would welcome such an occurrence, I just don’t think he’s A. expecting it, B. thinks it will make the future negotiating easier.  Remember, Obama went out of his way to acknowledge the Islamic Republic leadership in his television address to the country, becoming the first US administration to officially speak of or to the Regime.  By doing this, he is taking a gambit that by only dealing with the government in power can negotiations and rapprochement have a chance at succeeding.  The administration obviously did not think the Regime would be challenged during the upcoming election, but by Obama’s reserved reaction, it appears the administration is sticking with the game plan.

(Photo: New York Times)

Tags: Ahmadinejad, Iran, Iran Protest, Iranian nuclear program, Khamenei

Rashid, a highly touted Pakistani journalist, begins the final chapter of his 2000 ‘Taliban’ by calling the country one of world’s ‘orphaned conflict’s’.  The country would quickly change from being orphaned to a month after 9/11 being the center of global politics, as the United States uprooted the Taliban government and sent them packing, unfortunately for only a short-term vacation.

Rashid’s valuable book walks its readers through a rather dense social, religious, military, and even psychological history of the group of radicalized Pashtuns, known as the Taliban.  He provides a solid regional historical overview and does not forget the many geopolitical actors involved in the fragmented country (Iran, Turkmenistan, Saudi Arabia, etc.).  A solid half of the book details the violent rise to power of the Taliban as they battled first fellow Pashtun groups, than the government in Kabul, and finally the Northern Alliance actors, which would never relinquish their autonomy to Taliban-ruled Kabul and Kandahar.  This book is worth reading just for those who don’t know just how fractious the Afghan society can be with many various ethnicities and sects, all with foreign partners, that have had to violently attempt to protect themselves and further their own people’s positions.  This book, just like Afghanistan today, is full of conflict and violence that shows no real sign of ebbing.

Rashid provides a telling description of the early members of the Taliban (around 1994) as Afghans born in Pakistan and raised mainly by madrassas as their parents, especially mothers, may have been lost in the years of fighting during and after the Soviet invasion and withdrawal.  These young men had ‘no memories of the past, no plans for the future’ and knew of nothing else but their Taliban leaders.  Like we have heard many times in reference to terrorist and gang groups, the Taliban offered these men, and boys, a meaning to their lives that they could embrace and fight for.

This type of camaraderie of course becomes dangerous when it is based on ignorant, stubborn, violent, yet a strong ideology and form of Islam, as they, the Taliban, surely had.  The Taliban, which by 1996 controlled large swaths of Afghan territory, including Kabul, ruled with a fundamental Islamic iron fist that showed no accommodation, not even towards UN aid providers.  The Taliban was controlling a large population and recruiting members with a version of Islam that ‘divested’ it of nearly all of its positive legacies, including Islamic philosophy, science, arts, civil society, etc.  It was the Taliban’s way or the knife.  One has never read about a more oppressive society.

The Taliban did not become the Taliban, or rule, in a vacuum.  They were of course incubated and constantly nourished by the Pakistani government and ISI.  When the Taliban needed more troops in their battles with Masud and what would become the Northern Alliance, Pakistan would just close some of their madrassas in FATA or the Northwest Provinces and send the men over the border.  Rashid, who also spends time on Osama bin Ladin’s terrorist network in Afghanistan, accurately predicted that the Pakistani state and military were creating their own nightmare with their support of the Taliban, instead of the ’strategic depth’ they aimed for.  The author stated that the Islamic fundamentalism, drugs, weapons, and social breakdown that the Pakistani government was assisting the Taliban in performing or using, was making Islamabad ‘ripe for a Taliban-style Islamic revolution.’  While what is occurring today in Pakistan is so far, thankfully, not this extreme, it is too close for comfort.

Rashid’s ‘Taliban’ also details the human and women right’s abuses by the Taliban in great detail.  In addition, Rashid spends several chapters describing the ‘great game’ of pipeline politics in the Central Asia region and not surprisingly was correct in his assessment that Afghanistan, and the region as a whole, was just too unstable for Western groups to come in and build major gas and oil pipelines, no matter how much they wanted too.  Though these pipeline chapters were well researched, they can be passed over by most readers.

Rashid’s book provides much more than the history and make-up of a group that the powerful United States military is having a hell of a time defeating, it brings to life the challenging modern history of a people who have only known violence in their lives.  It is sad to think that one cannot imagine this changing in the near or even long-term future.  Though Rashid’s work is far from perfect, too many assumptions presented as facts (he is a journalist by trade), it brings light on a dangerous and important group, geopolitical actors and actions in a key region of the world, and on the suffering of millions.

Tags: Ahmed Rashid, Iran, Islam, Islamic extremism, Osama bin Ladin, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Taliban, terrorism

Regarding some of President Obama’s recent foreign policy moves, I have on several occasions thought and written here on GPP, ‘what’s in it for us?’, or ‘How does this concretely help either side?’ Most of this comes from soft power moves of Obama apologizing or distancing himself from American ‘arrogance’ or mistakes. I know state leaders need to play a bit to their foreign audience, but I don’t quite buy the theory that this type of ‘rapprochement’ brings either truly better strategic relationships between allies or makes enemies into partners ready to deal. If the US president was going to disparage the country and let others agenda’s trump our own at times, I would at least like to see some hard results, such as Russia denouncing North Korea’s missile launch (they did the opposite) or truly help out on Iran or maybe some stronger NATO commitment in Afghanistan. Alas, after stating all of this I am willing to give President Obama time. Time to show that all of this is part of larger strategic plan that will pay off dividends for the US and international security.

It is on that positive note that I turn to another topic, where I’m afraid I think Obama’s long-term plan is unfortunately not attainable and therefore his current moves might hurt more than help. I am talking about Obama’s Czech speech, where he laid out his policy towards nuclear weapons. He stated that the US would reduce their nuclear weapon collection, deemphasize their use in military affairs, and lastly that because the US was the only nation to use the weapon, we bare a ‘moral’ responsibility to work toward their elimination.

First off, about the ‘moral’ responsibility part. As horrible as the US use of nuclear weapons against Japan in WWII, I would disagree that it was immoral, in terms of state actions. The US and Japan were losing thousands of soldiers in the fighting around Japan, with Japan also losing thousands of civilians by Allied bombing of their cities on a daily basis, and the US calculated that they needed to end the war as soon as possible and utilized their most effective/destructive weapon to do so. This move caused untold human destruction, but it also saved thousands of other Japanese and American lives and ended the bloodiest war known to mankind. Since the wars end, the US and Japan have also had a strategic, friendly, and prosperous relationship. The US does indeed carry with it a burden of the weapons’ use, but I would argue against America still having any ‘moral responsibility’ for it use during what was an extraordinary moment in world history.

Alright, back to the speeches main points: A world without nukes sounds wonderful, but it is not realistic nor I think an area where Obama should be spending his global political capital. In his speech, Obama alluded that if the US showed it was willing to lessen its support of nuclear weapons, all other states, especially rogue ones, would feel less threatened and it would help the global norm against the weapon as a choice for states. In other words, if the US stopped being nuclear hypocrites other states and regimes would give up their nuclear ambitions. Unfortunately, history tells us otherwise. Did India, Pakistan, Iran, North Korea, South Africa, France, Great Britain, Al Qaeda all pursue nuclear weapons because the US had them? No, they pursued them for their own national strategic interests and defense.

What about the idea of a nuclear free-world? Though it would be very difficult to reach, wouldn’t it be a wonderful thing? Not really. As I have discussed before on GPP, I feel that states would still not trust that the others did not have nuclear weapons and this would create a security dilemma, where states would inevitably try to circumvent or protect themselves from another by obtaining them again! Except we would have to relive the dangerous early part of ‘who has the weapon?’, ‘will they use it?’ This sounds like a scary, unpredictable world to me. I would rather have our current situation where only a few, mostly stable states, hold nuclear weapons and it is well-known who. To have a world with no nukes would require some form of strong world government to verify this outcome and that does not appear on the horizon.

'I thought your speech was very inspirational Mr. Obama'

So once again, I ask about a new US foreign policy stance or maneuver, what does the US or world get out of this policy? Will it cause Iran to come to the negotiating table and actually negotiate instead of buy time? Will it stop North Korea from launching another missile, which may one day carry a nuclear weapon, in six months? Will it end nukes forever in 30 years? How does this policy make the US and world safer?

Tags: deterrence, Iran, missiles, Nukes, Obama, WWII

I listened (and kinda watched) Robert Baer’s presentation in front of the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco, found below. Baer, a former CIA agent and author of ‘The Devil We Know: Dealing with the New Iranian Superpower‘, is an astute and seasoned veteran of US-Iran relations. He is a strong believer that the US must look past President Ahmadinejad’s erratic behavior and focus on the real center of Iran’s power, Ayatollah Khamenei, who he sees as a rational political being. Baer extends his argument by asserting that the Shia of the Middle East are overall more predictable and rational than their Sunni brethren. In any case, the main point from Baer is that the US can and should negotiate the Iranian state.

The debate over whether the Islamic Republic of Iran is a rational state like all others in the international system is an important one with obvious implications. I have covered the issue at least twice in my academic career, writing a paper that argued Iran should be considered a normal state (Iran: Welcome to the Nuclear Family), and one that argues the opposite (Iran’s Continuous Revolution). In the first paper, I argued that a nuclear armed Iran would act rationally like other states armed with such a destructive weapon, cautiously. The second paper argued that ever since the 1979 Islamic-controlled revolution the state has been led by leaders who have in many ways gone against international norms and followed irrational foreign policies.

I think Bush looked at the Iranian regime the way my second paper did, as a state that would not follow the rules and couldn’t be dealt with directly. Judging by Obama’s early rhetoric and call for direct negotiations, one has to think he believes the country’s leaders are rational and in turn can be diplomatic partners. Though contrary to most accounts, the Bush administration did at times ‘talk’ with Iranian counterparts, but usually only on low levels. The past administration also joined the Europeans in making the Iranian state several decent offers to stop enriching uranium, but without success or really even any signs of progress. Obama has led one to believe he will take a more forward approach to the Iranian regime, but exactly how still remains to be seen. I doubt Obama himself will head to Tehran any time soon, but one can see him sending Sec of State Clinton to meet with Iran’s equally prominent Foreign Minister at a neutral site in Europe some where.

The Obama administration’s progress in terms of US-Iran negotiations (besides the nuclear issue, Iran is an important player in Afghanistan and Iraq’s present and future) will largely depend on reciprocal diplomatic advancements from the Ayatollah, and that is where the previous argument comes back into play. What drives Ayatollah Khamenei and his partners? Do they seek to spread their version of Shia Islam across the Middle East, destroy Israel, and battle the ‘Great Satan’ United States as long it exists? Or is the state just following pragmatic policies that strengthen it at home and abroad?

Tags: Bush, CIA, Great Satan, Iran, Iranian nuclear program, Obama, Robert Baer, US foreign policy

Just as we were discussing the challenges of running an intelligence agency in a democracy, a story breaks showcasing exactly how complicated it can be. The New York Times has broken a story that the Bush administration flat out stopped an attack on Iran’s nuclear program by Israel earlier this year. Israel did not even request full participation, just bunker busting bombs, Iraq overflight rights, and refueling. The Bush administration would not go along with it, for reasons that I want to discuss in post tomorrow when I have more time. In any case, this is an interesting storyline to read, ‘Bush stops attack on Iran’, as in the past three years I have read many ‘reports‘ that claimed Bush was going to launch a massive attack. Seymour Hirsch of the New Yorker was especially loud about this prediction.

Another part of this story, the one involving the CIA directly, is that it appears that the US tried to assuage the Israelis, though this was definitely not the only reason, by stating that it had launched a major covert operation, which hopefully combined with tough financial sanctions, would stop the Iran’s nuclear program.  Reading about this ‘covert’ plan to disable Iran’s nuclear plants, specifically at Natanz, in the New York Freaking Times, made me think ‘how is this covert? and should the NYTimes be printing this?’  The job of the media is to be a watchdog and make sure our government is responsibly led, but is reporting American secret intelligence and spy tactics in an ongoing process going over the line?

Anyway, there’s a lot to this story and this is all I can write about right now, but there is always tomorrow.  I’ll be back tomorrow, but please let me know what you think about this whole mess.

Tags: CIA, Iran, Israel, nuclear program, Nukes

*Contributing Writers:  From time to time, GPP will have a couple regular and guest contributers write posts about issues related to their background and expertise, for instance Hubbel Relat’s Latin American post below.  These contributers will have varying political orientations and nationalities, hopefully bringing fresh perspectives to many pertinent foreign policy issues.  Look on the About page for their bios.

Iran, Iran, Iran. That about says it all. US-Iranian relations have been one of the most contentious and provocative elements of world politics over the last 30 years and even if a rapprochement is formulated by both sides, this should not change. US rapprochement with Iran was a superficial hot topic during the presidential debate, never going further than the discussion of whether or not it was right policy for the US president to have unconditional talks with his Iranian counterpart. Obama leaned in this direction and McCain did not, and it went no further.

No matter how much the US wishes or denies it, Iran is a regional power, and US policy towards the country must be based on this assumption. This does not mean the US should yield its regional influence to Iran, it just means that Iran’s strategic interests must be taken into account. After Obama won the election, Iranian President Ahmadinejad sent him a congratulatory note, but since then the Iranian government has backed off reconciliation;

“People who put on a mask of friendship, but with the objective of betrayal, and who enter from the angle of negotiations without preconditions, are more dangerous,” Hossein Taeb, deputy commander of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps “The power holders in the new American government are trying to regain their lost influence with a tactical change in their foreign diplomacy. They are shifting from a hard conflict to a soft attack.”

Iran's Missile Test (Source Washington Post)

These lines of course were stated just days before Iran successfully tested a new generation of long-range missiles which could travel over 1,200 miles.

Many have argued in favor of a full reconciliation by both sides, US end the containment and military threats and Iran the terrorist and anti-American acts and speeches, yet it has not happened. Why not? And will it happen soon with Obama in the White House and Ahmadinejad possibly replaced early next year?

There are many reasons why the two sides have been at each other’s throats, both of the external strategic and domestic variety. The Middle East and after 9/11, Central Asia, are both central to US foreign policy and security, basically because of oil and transnational terrorism. (we must also not forget the battle for influence against the Soviets during the Cold War) While Iran, a nation with a strong imperial past in the region, also has strategic security interests in both areas, so it is not surprising that the two butt heads on more than a few occasions. The US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which basically pin Iran down in the middle, are two of the biggest strategic elephants in the room in history for the Iranians. The US desires stable and friendly Afghan and Iraq states, while Iran desires them even more! The state of Israel cannot be ignored, as these two behemoths seem to be on opposite sides of the spectrum in defending/antagonizing the Jewish state, though scholar Trita Parsi reminds us that Israel and Iran were not always such enemies.

Domestic politics also are a wedge in a future partnership between the two powers. The Islamic Republic, Iran’s government since the overthrow of the US supported Shah, bases a decent amount of its legitimacy on its anti-Western, anti-US policy. The US is the straw man for Ayatollah Khamenei, the real leader of Iran, not Ahmadinejad, as Akbar Ganji points out this month in Foreign Affairs. If things are going wrong in Iran just blame or start bashing the US is one of Khamenei’s favorite policies. It is important for all to know that when Obama speaks of meeting with Iranian leaders, he, or at least he should be, meaning Khamenei, not Ahmadinejad. Because of the nature of the Islamic Republic and its leader, it would take quite the external and internal strategic maneuver in order for Khamenei to maintain his government’s legitimacy and more important for him, authority. In US domestic politics, Obama would face much resistance from the American right if they believed he was either handing Iraq or nuclear weapons into Iran’s hands.

Back to rapprochement: it appears that the Bush administration may make some moves in his final couple months in order to take off some of the pressure of Obama’s first term. First off, Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett, two former Bush NSC members, are loudly voicing their approval of such a policy and Stratfor’s George Friedman claims to have ’sources’ that confirm Bush’s support of such a policy. Bush would need to have Iran’s cooperation in Iraq in order for a deal to be made it appears. The issue of Iran’s nuclear weapons program, like in this post, was largely ignored in Friedman’s analysis though.

Any way you slice it, President-elect will have his hands full on the Iranian issue for probably most if not all his presidency. I would like to think that the chance of a major thaw is on the horizon, but strategic interests, domestic politics, and history tell me otherwise.

Tags: Ahmadinejad, Iran, Khamenei, missiles, Nukes

Within hours of Barack Obama’s presidential election victory, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev made a national speech where he stated his government’s intent to deploy short range missiles near the Poland border. Needless to say, Medvedev and the Russian government are upset with the US-Poland-Czech missile defense agreement (Missile Defense System MDS). This of course comes just a month after Moscow announced it was to begin a ‘wholesale renovation‘ of their nuclear deterrence capabilities.

The Bush Administration’s decision to install these missile defense systems in Eastern Europe and the Russian response have so far, and should continue to be, intriguing great power vs. great power behavior to watch. The situation begs many questions: Why is the US doing this? Can the missile shield system even work? How should/are the Russians viewing this? What effect will this have on Iran’s nuclear policy, as the missile shield is largely aimed at them? What’s in it for Poland and Czech? Will Barack Obama continue this policy? I cannot tackle all of these today, but in due time, my friends.

On the technical side of the issue, aka whether or not the Poland-Czech, or any other, MDS will actually work, is not my expertise. I have been informed that many in the physics and science (a little broad) community argue that the MDS have never shown an ability to work in a real-time situation and are mainly just a waste of tax dollars. Here is a quote by Frederick K. Lamb, who co-chaired a 2003 American Physical Society study on boost-phase intercept systems for missile defense.

“Not a single test of this system has ever been carried out under realistic combat conditions,” said Lamb. “To assume it is going to work under realistic conditions with only a few minutes warning is like assuming a gun that has only been fired against a single, carefully arranged target in a brightly lit firing range is going to be successful in a fast-moving night battle against many enemies.”

On the other hand, the US military has argued that the shields show great promise and have actually worked, only they (thankfully) haven’t been put into play in a real life situation.

But putting aside the MDS actual capabilities, why would the US want to do this? The Bush administration has not been shy in arguing that they will help protect or deter the use of nuclear or conventional attacks on Europe from rogue states, mainly Iran. Another explicit and implicit reason would be that the systems pull Czech Republic and Poland closer to the United States. Now these states are already in the NATO alliance and for the most part are not in danger of moving into Moscow’s sphere, but in international politics, nothing is forever, and one can view this as the US doubling-down on the partnership. While, how could this be positive with Medvedev and Putin’s rhetoric and recent provocative moves, as in, isn’t the US just getting Moscow anger and forcing them to push back for very little gain? Good question. Moscow is indeed gaining strength and have not been afraid to show it, Georgia, Venezuela, Central Asia, and many have argued that this MDS is still treating Russia like the weak country it mainly was for the last fifteen years. But I would challenge this assumption. Russia is indeed much stronger today, and their successful military moves in Georgia require respect, but the US should not feel the need to pull back, and this includes in deep Eastern Europe. Russia may be moving missiles closer to Poland, but they will not dare to actually do anything. The MDS agreement with Poland was basically a security pact, calling for the US to come to its aid if under attack. Moscow’s power has largely risen from a booming economy and those days are largely over with gas and oil prices starting to plummet.

Medvedev and Putin have proven themselves to be adept geopolitical players and the US must be careful in all their moves in Moscow’s sphere, for instance, the US should back off from Georgia’s admittance into NATO, but since the fall of the Soviet Union the US has made amazing inroads into Eastern Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia and it should not relinquish these easily. We all know that Russia plays hardball, and by standing tall on Poland and Czech’s missile system the US is crowding the plate, so we’ll just see if Russia’s down to throw one high and inside.

Tags: Iran, Medvedev, Missile Defense System, missiles, Nukes, Obama, Putin, Russia