I went under the hot lights and answered a few questions thrown my way by FMFP on President Obama’s recent speech on the Arab Spring in the Middle East:

1. What was the main takeaway or takeaways from the President’s speech?

Pat: Firstly, that the US continues to put its weight behind the forces of democracy and liberalism in their foreign affairs. President Obama’s speech channeled his inner George W. Bush and Woodrow Wilson in this speech, unequivocally putting the United States on the side of those seeking political and social freedoms in the Middle East. Now following up this rhetoric with policies is the hard part. It is much easier to critique the Bahrain government is a speech in Washington D.C. than in person when they are holding the rights to a key American naval base. The President offered economic aid in the form of loans, investments, debt forgiveness to Egypt and Tunisia, but these will need the backing of other international actors, including the IMF and their new leader, and will take awhile to see fruit.

Another takeaway is that the Obama administration wants you to believe they were not got off guard with these events in the Middle East. This is not surprising as every administration/leader wants to appear omnipresent and in charge, but the ad hoc approach taken by the administration as these events unfolded presented a different picture. Basically, the administration seemed to just be tackling the events individually as they arose as best they could. This is not a huge criticism as few saw this coming and there were many tough calls (Mubarak alone) to be made, but these events did bring to light the fact that the administration had no overarching strategy or outlook to base its policy on.

A final takeaway is the fact that this President can’t help himself when it comes to the Israel-Palestinian eternal conflict. This in many ways is praiseworthy as the President refuses to throw up his hands at the continual roadblocks to this seemingly intractable problems. But I just don’t get it. With Hamas coming back into the fold and Netanyahu holding strong, it is difficult to imagine a solution to this issue anytime soon.

2. Did the President comment on US policy toward the Arab Spring – the political uprisings against dictators in Syria, Egypt, Yemen and other countries?

Pat: Very much so, but not with too many specifics. He did say that Syrian dictator Bashar Assad had to implement reforms or ‘get out of the way’, by far President Obama’s strongest rhetoric on Syria’s uprising. Obama also had relatively strong words for the leaders of Bahrain and Yemen, two US allies. The President tried to put the US on the side of all the peaceful demonstrators and made a convincing argument (though I’m a sympathetic ear) that American interests are furthered in the long term when more people get to have a voice in their government. The problem is this gets blurry quickly. The US does not want the Yemen or Bahrain governments toppled by extreme anti- American forces that could hurt our interests. The US also does not wish to see the Muslim Brotherhood gain too much power in Egypt. Instability anywhere is also a global harm that the administration should be weary of, as I believe was a heavy consideration for intervening in Libya (right next door to a vulnerable Egypt).

3. Did the President address the topic of foreign aid to Pakistan? In the last ten years, America gave some $20 billion in foreign aid to Pakistan ($9 billion to fight militants). After talk of Pakistan aiding al Qaeda and other terrorist networks, does the President have a position on whether we should continue supporting this critical state?

Pat: No, he did not, but in fairness this was a speech about the Middle East. Obama has been quiet about aid to Pakistan since the Osama assassination. The President is keeping close to vest on this one, I believe, because his administration probably has no plans to curtail the current aid package to Pakistan. The American people are clearly fed up with Pakistan government and military as only 17% support maintaining the aid in one poll, but realpolitik comes into play here. Unfortunately, the US is still dependent on the Pakistan state and military for a positive outcome in Afghanistan and for information regarding anti-US militants inside of Pakistan. The US is in bed with Pakistan in the War on Terror and its a bed with tight sheets.

4. On the topic of Israel and Palestine, the President advocated a return to pre-1967 War borders. Clearly this was not welcome news for Israeli supporters and its president who just visited with Obama. Is this a change in US policy? What will likely be the implications of such a policy?

Pat: Obama has argued that it is not a change, but perception matters greatly, and others, including AIPAC, Palestinian and Israeli leadership, major American news outlets, believe it was a shift. Obama has bent over backwards the past few days to calm everyone down and try to emphasize the ‘swap’ part of his 1967 borders statement, but this has likely made a difficult situation that much harder. Israeli leader Netanyahu has already come out strong against any idea that Israel will ever return to borders before the 1967 war, calling it not ‘reality‘. A situation that didn’t need anymore setbacks, just appeared to get another one.

5. Did the President address the efforts of the US and NATO in Libya, Iraq or Afghanistan – our three military fronts in the Middle East?

Pat: Iraq was mentioned in a positive light. In fact, President Obama brought it up as a possible shining example of a pluralistic society governing itself democratically to all the other states in the region going through either rebellion or democratic growing pains. The President reiterated the fact that the US, along with the international community, halted a large scale massacre in Libya by acting with force and that  Qaddafi will have to go eventually. It is interesting to note though how Tunisia, Egypt, and even Bahrain and Syria, received either more or almost as much attention in the speech as Libya, a state we are currently at war with! Afghanistan was mentioned exactly once and I can shorten the only sentence even further: Taliban on run, US troops leaving soon, Afghans will take lead. Heck, that was almost as long as the actual Afghan part of the speech!

The Hawk and the Dove is a compelling and accessible dual biography of Cold War strategists Paul Nitze and George Kennan.  Nicholas Thompson, the author, is Nitze’s grandson, but Thompson doesn’t allow this familiar attachment to cloud his objectivity.  Instead, Thompson respectfully analyzes, compares, and contrasts the views held by Nitze and Kennan throughout their lives.

As Thompson readily admits in the book’s introduction, “[n]either of these idiosyncratic and original men conformed exactly to the hawk and dove labels, of course.”  Kennan, the alleged dove, thought the U.S. should have gone to war over the Iran hostage crisis and once wrote, “Perhaps the whole idea of world peace has been a premature, unworkable grandiose form of daydreaming…” Nitze, the alleged hawk, rejected SIOP-62, which advocated obliterating the Soviet Union after a Soviet attack, favoring “flexible response,” in which the U.S. would respond proportionately and hopefully avoid a broader conflict.  Sometimes Nitze and Kennan’s policy prescriptions were actually in synch.  Both helped create the Marshall Plan, both supported U.S. involvement in the Korean War and opposed crossing the 38th parallel, and both opposed the Vietnam War relatively early in the conflict.

Thompson even argues that Kennan and Nitze deliberately constructed fictional personas, a phenomenon demonstrated by the Nitze-Kennan disagreement over the nature of containment.  Kennan, who prescribed containment in his Long Telegram and his Foreign Affairs X article, believed the tools of containment should be primarily economic and political.  Nitze, in NSC-68, which he co-authored, favored militaristic containment, advocating a massive conventional arms build-up.  However, as Thompson probes deeper, the line between the hawk and the dove blurs.  Thompson notes that Nitze based his NSC-68 arguments on a paper Kennan had penned.  Also, in the 1970’s, Kennan was trying to portray himself as a proponent of peace and began to actively suppress documents that might lead people to believe that he supported militaristic containment. Kennan was not as dovish as he claimed.

However, Thompson does not intend for his book’s title to be ironic.  Despite the aforementioned hawk-and-dove line-blurring, Thompson hopes to draw a sharp contrast between Kennan and Nitze.  In Thompson’s narrative, the two strategists drift slowly away from one another, and the bifurcation reaches its apogee in the late 1970’s, “when nuclear weapons haunted every element of America’s foreign policy, Nitze and Kennan seemed to agree on nothing.  Now they truly became the hawk and the dove.”  But Thompson struggles to back this claim.  He notes that in the early 1980’s Kennan advocated a 50% reduction in nuclear stockpiles and a two-thirds reduction in arsenal size.  However, he also writes earlier that Nitze, participating in the second round of SALT talks under Nixon, advocated proposing a 40% reduction in nuclear arsenal size.  Furthermore, Nitze believed Kennan’s 1980’s proposal could work, as long as the “throw weight” factor was taken into consideration. Such examples lead the reader to wonder if Thompson has merely bought into the fiction of the hawk-dove distinction.

Thompson also examines the Nitze-Kennan disagreement over the nature of America, and this debate actually proves more compelling than the hawk-dove distinction.  Thompson successfully traces Kennan’s authoritarian bent throughout his career.  Kennan wrote an essay in the 1930’s about the positive aspects of authoritarianism and wrote in the 1950’s that the West “could be saved from itself only by 50 years of benevolent dictatorship which would, like a doctor, restore the patient to a reasonable state of origin and then put him on his own again.”  Freed from the constraints of U.S. idealism, Kennan could see the flaws in American democracy.  He once compared democracy to a “prehistoric monster,” for “[h]e is slow to wrath – in fact, you practically have to whack his tail off to make him aware that his interests are being disturbed; but, once he grasps this, he lays about him with such blind determination that he not only destroys his adversary but largely wrecks his native habitat.”  Nitze, on the other hand, could not see such problems as clearly.  Pondering Japanese conduct in World War II on his way to visit the devastation of Hiroshima, Nitze concluded that the Japanese were “the most hateful of all people on earth.”  The irony of such a statement, made en route to a site where the U.S. killed tens of thousands of civilians, is lost on Nitze, but made clear to the reader by Thompson.  Nitze was so enamored by his country that he could not see its flaws.

On the question of the U.S.’s moral superiority, Thompson keeps to his usual objectivity, flirting with both sides of the argument.  At times, Thompson paints the Soviet Union as the U.S.’s foil.  For example, he contrasts Joseph McCarthy’s hearings over Robert Oppenheimer’s alleged communist activities with the Soviet Union’s execution of Lavrenti Beria.  Oppenheimer was an intellectual who opposed the hydrogen bomb.  Beria was a torturer and a rapist who found himself embroiled in a power struggle in the wake of Stalin’s death.  Oppenheimer faced harsh congressional hearings and had his security clearance revoked.  Beria was executed with a pistol.  With this example Thompson insinuates that McCarthyism, though unfortunate, was far more civil than parallel struggles in the Soviet Union.  However, Thompson finds frequent similarities between U.S. and Soviet foreign policy.  Both countries were willing to do whatever it would take to win the Cold War, no matter the moral costs, and were thus moral peers.  Thompson leaves his readers to draw their own conclusions about where they fall on the realism-idealism spectrum.

The Nitze-Kennan disagreements are a useful lens through which to examine America’s rise to global prominence after World War II.  As John Lewis Gaddis notes on the book’s back cover, Kennan and Nitze were “the Adams and Jefferson of the Cold War.”  Though their disagreements did not always result in drastically different policy prescriptions, their contrasting worldviews present two very different ways to approach international politics.

Rob Grace blogs for the Foreign Policy Association at http://lawandsecurity.foreignpolicyblogs.com.  He has an MA in International Relations from NYU and a BA in Drama from Vassar College.  He is also an award-winning playwright whose work has been produced around the globe.

'The name's Robert Gates, and I'm a damn fine Secretary of Defense'

In a speech to NATO officers at the National Defense University, US Secretary of State Robert Gates made this statement:

“The demilitarization of Europe — where large swaths of the general public and political class are averse to military force and the risks that go with it — has gone from a blessing in the 20th century to an impediment to achieving real security and lasting peace in the 21st.”

Gates went on to warn that the perception of European weakness could provide a “temptation to miscalculation and aggression” by hostile powers. These comments of course come on the heels of what appears to be a Dutch troop retreat from Afghanistan in the coming year. Gates went on to say that financial and man power shortcomings by many NATO members was “directly impacting operations” in Afghanistan. Also noted by Gates in his address, was the fact that only 5 of the 28 NATO members have reached the established target: 2 percent of gross domestic product for defense spending. Polls have shown a growing gulf between how Americans and Europeans see the world, and especially the use of force in international politics.

These are strong statements from a strong leader from NATO’s leading country and should not be taken lightly.

Looking from and IR theory standpoint, we have clear signs of realism and liberalism here. Realists would argue that of course the European states are bandwagoning and letting the United State foot the bill, both in lives and treasure. After all, it appears the Americans are willing to make the sacrifices in Afghanistan no matter the overall NATO commitment. Realists would also not be surprised to see Secretary Gates lament this situation. This current predicament also has strong IR liberal ties. To a certain extent, America’s European NATO partners live in a post-realist world, where international law, globalization of economic goods, technology, and ideas, and a greater emphasis on diplomacy are much more effective tools in fomenting world peace and stability. Of course, when one does not have a powerful military, promoting these facets, one’s you are strong in, just makes sense. As Robert Kagan has argued, the US wishes to live in this world with Europe, but is too busy facing a realist world with problems and actors that may require realist tools, such as the use of military force and deterrence. The US believes without the presence of such tools, as Gates states ‘achieving real security and lasting peace in the 21st’ may not be possible.

Settle down Poland.

Though I have already voiced my concerns, and for the most part, disapproval, of the Obama administration’s decision to scrap the major missile shield in Poland and Czech Republic, I was pleased to see the rather quick move to sure up these Eastern European allies with Vice President Joseph Biden’s visits over the last week.  Biden made stops in Poland, Czech Republic, and Romania with reassurance high on the agenda.  These states were shaken by Obama’s decision and several key leaders from the region (including Vaclav Havel and Lech Walesa)  wrote an open letter to the administration calling for the US president not to forget about them as they try to improve relations with Moscow.  While in Poland, Biden discussed a new plan which would place SM-3 anti-ballistic missiles at a former air base in the town of Redzikowo in northern Poland.  It was reported early that the US would also station numerous Patriot missiles in the country.  Poland, Czech Republic, Ukraine, and the other Eastern European don’t really fear a missile attack from Iran, but what they do fear are Russian boots on the ground.  Being close to the world’s superpower, better yet having its military personnel on your territory, is helpful in keeping the wolves at bay.  Hopefully, this Biden visit is followed by concrete measures that continue to tie these still nascent democracies towards the West and keep Moscow from fomenting any serious expansionist plans.  

While the relatively fast response to get back in line with our Eastern European allies was encouraging, a couple other recent developments by the Obama administration were a little, yes you got it, discouraging.  

With almost the first year of Obama’s presidency in the books it’s starting to become pretty clear that his administration is, in IR speak, part internationalist liberal, in the sense that they have strongly supported international law, the United Nations, multilateral rhetoric (if not action), and on the other hand, realist, as in stressing pragmatism, containment, and in de-emphasizing human rights and democracy in relations with other nations.  Kind of a Jeffersonian view of the world if you follow WR Mead’s view of American society.  Now this is a wide brush and I look forward to explaining it in more depth in later posts, but for right now I want to focus on the human rights aspect.  

The Obama administration is obviously in favor of human rights, but it has shown that it for the most part is taking a hands off approach.  In dealing with states such as Iran, Russia, Sudan, Egypt, China, etc., the issue of their internal human rights violations is a tricky subject to say the least, but so far the trend for the administration has been to put human rights and democracy issues second to more concrete, pressing problems such as nukes, security, economics, etc.  Obama’s decision to not see the Dalai Lama before visiting Beijing is a prime example of this policy.  Now, I disagree with this specific move and in terms of Iran, I think the administration may be blowing a major chance by legitimizing a nefarious government that could possibly collapse with more pressure, but I cannot reflexively denounce these moves out of hand.  I sympathize with the challenge of working in partnership with a leader and government that is authoritarian and violates human rights as at times it must be done. There are too many important security issues at stake and at times human rights and the spread of democracy must take a back seat.  

Where was I getting with this?  Oh yeah.  But I also found out about this and it did make me upset.  The Obama administration has decided to save 2-3 million dollars by stopping the funding for New Haven, Conn.-based Iran Human Rights Documentation Center, which does what its name implies, and Freedom House’s Gozaar project, an online Farsi- and English-language forum for discussing political issues.  These small projects and organizations work diligently to highlight the democratic/human rights problems in the Islamic Republic of Iran and, specifically in the case of Gozaar, provide a place where Iranian citizens can communicate with other people living in free societies.  I interviewed to work for Gozaar at one time and found their operation and staff inspirational.  At a time when the US government is spending like a teenager with a credit card, it was surprised me to hear that these programs where on the chopping block.  I don’t get it and I don’t like it.  

I was going to talk about Afghanistan too, but I think we all need a break.  Ok, Ok, I need a break.

Since Obama’s Cairo speech much has been written, but I would like to highlight three specific pieces that I feel provocatively tackle what the speech means to US foreign policy, more specifically, the way President Obama seeks to lead it, going forward.  All of these pieces to varying degrees discuss the importance of identity politics in Obama’s approach, very much seen in his Cairo speech.  I’m talking about Obama himself as an identity, Islam as an identity, and the US’s ‘changing identity’.  This in turn leads the authors to focus on how Obama believes that with a change in identity and approach, challenges facing the United States and international security (Iran, terrorism, Israel-Palestine, North Korea, Cuba, etc.) have a greater chance of being solved.  These writers open the door to what may become a serious facet of an Obama led foreign policy and they all come across concerned.  Here they are below, each with a short excerpt:

1. Robert Kagan’s Woodrow Wilson’s Heir -

Like Wilson’s, Obama’s foreign policy increasingly seems to rest on the assumption that nations will act on the basis of what they perceive to be the goodwill, good intentions or moral purity of other nations, in particular the United States. If other nations have refused to cooperate with us, it is because they perceive the United States as aggressive or evil. Obama’s job is to change that perception.

2. David J. Rothkopf’s On Equivalency: Introducing the President of Newton’s Third Law of Motion… -

The answer as to whether Obama ultimately lives up to our hopes or our fears come when his actions illustrate whether there are values we are not willing to negotiate, points that can’t be balanced, enemies we are willing to oppose, friends we are willing to stand by even when it is unpopular. Tell me the day that Obama is willing to make his first enemy in order to defend a deeply held principle and I will tell you the day he ascends from being a politician to being a statesman.

3. Christian Brose’s From One Cairo Speech to Another –

can’t help but feel frustrated that I’ve been watching Obama closely for more than two years now, and after an hour-long speech in Cairo today, I still don’t have a clear read of which way he’ll come down on the looming hard decisions for which there is no middle ground, try as he may to carve some out.

I don’t think I have ever mentioned this, but I Love Tony Blair. While, I love what he stands for at least (and his accent too!). My fiance would probably have a problem if I really ‘loved’ him. The former British Prime Minister made one of the most remarkable and inspiring speeches about the role of the US and West in the world and the challenges they face, this past weekend for the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. In this speech Blair doubles down on his interventionist, liberal world view that the West should be have an active agenda when it comes to bringing freedom and opportunity to countries and peoples who are suppressed. In this he argues that both soft power and hard power will be required and useful. Blair convincingly details the continuing troubles with certain followers of an extreme form of Islam and rightly argues against the idea that the US/West are in anyway responsible for the terrorism brought against them. To Blair, terrorism and violence against civilians is wrong, period. I strongly urge everyone to listen to this speech. Here is the transcript. Below I will have several key sections of his talk without comments, but would love to discuss them in the comment section.

The West Must Stand Firm (Audio)

Blair’s rejection of going back to a realist foreign policy:

So: should we now revert to a more traditional foreign policy, less bold, more cautious; less idealistic, more pragmatic, more willing to tolerate the intolerable because of fear of the unpredictable consequences that intervention can bring?

My argument is that the case for the doctrine I advocated ten years ago, remains as strong now as it was then; and that what has really changed is the context in which the doctrine has to be applied. The struggle in which we are joined today is profound in its danger; requires engagement of a different and more comprehensive kind; and can only be won by the long haul. The context therefore is much tougher. But the principle is the same.

Better to intervene than to leave well alone. Be bold, adventurous even in what we can achieve.

Blair defining the trouble with and within Islam:

Of course, each arena of conflict has its own particular characteristics, its own origins in political or territorial disputes, its own claims and counter-claims of injustice. Of course the solution in each case will be in many respects different. But it is time to wrench ourselves out of a state of denial. There is one major factor in common. In each conflict there are those deeply engaged in it, who argue that they are fighting in the true name of Islam.

And here is the crucial point. This didn’t start on 11th September 2001, or shortly before it. The roots aren’t near the surface. It was in the 1970s that Pakistan’s leadership decided to re-define itself through religious conviction. The storming of the Holy Mosque in Mecca took place years ago. Al Qaida began in earnest in the 1980s. In many Arab and Muslim nations, there was more tolerance and less religiosity in the 1960s, than today. The doctrinal roots of this growing movement can be traced even further back to the period in the late 19th and early 20th century where modernising and moderate clerics and thinkers were slowly but surely pushed aside by the hard-line dogma of those, whose cultural and theological credentials were often dubious, but whose appeal lay in the simplicity of the message : Islam, they say, lost its way; the reason was its departure from the true faith as stated immutably in the 7th century ; and the answer is to return to it and in doing so, vanquish Islam’s foes, in the West and most especially within the ruling parties of the Islamic world itself.

Blair’s one sentence description of who’s responsible for terrorism:

The responsibility for terrorism lies with the terrorist and no-one else.

Blair discussing the positives, as well, as limitations of engagement and diplomacy:

President Obama’s reaching out to the Muslim world at the start of a new American administration, is welcome, smart, and can play a big part in defeating the threat we face. It disarms those who want to say we made these enemies, that if we had been less confrontational they would have been different. It pulls potential moderates away from extremism.

But it will expose, too, the delusion of believing that there is any alternative to waging this struggle to its conclusion. The ideology we are fighting is not based on justice. That is a cause we can understand. And world-wide these groups are adept, certainly, at using causes that indeed are about justice, like Palestine. Their cause, at its core, however, is not about the pursuit of values that we can relate to; but in pursuit of values that directly contradict our way of life. They don’t believe in democracy, equality or freedom. They will espouse, tactically, any of these values if necessary. But at heart what they want is a society and state run on their view of Islam. They are not pluralists. They are the antithesis of pluralism. And they don’t think that only their own community or state should be like that. They think the world should be governed like that.

In other words, there may well be groups, or even Governments, that can be treated with, and with whom we can reach an accommodation. Negotiation and persuasion can work and should be our first resort. If they do, that’s great, which is why if Hamas were to accept the principle of a peaceful two state solution, they could be part of the process agreeing it. But the ideology, as a movement within Islam, has to be defeated. It is incompatible not with ‘the West’ but with any society of open and tolerant people and that in particular means the many open and tolerant Muslims.

Blair’s concluding pep talk to America and the West:

We have to re-discover some confidence and conviction in who we are, how far we’ve come and what we believe in….We are standing up for what is right. The body of ideas that has given us this liberty, to speak and think as we wish, that allows us to vote in and vote out our rulers, that provides a rule of law on which we can rely, and a political space infinitely more transparent than anything that went before ; that body isn’t decaying. It is in the prime of life. It is the future.

This is international liberalism and American idealism at its most inspiring and convincing.

Alright, I’m pretty sure I’ve got you confused already by the title.  Let me explain, or at least attempt to. Much has been leaked that the upcoming Obama policy plan for Afghanistan will take a ‘minimalist‘ approach to the crucial, yet troubling security situation in South Asia.  In other words, Obama may downplay talk and attempts to create a democratic and prosperous Afghanistan, and instead aim for the creation of a stable country that can defend against extremists and terrorist elements at home and keep them from reaching abroad, especially to American shores.  Now at this moment this is no sure policy-thing, as the report has yet to be released and Obama has used heavy rhetoric and significant troop commitments to the country to possibly suggest otherwise.  

However, others have already given their views of what policy the US should follow in Kabul and beyond. Many of these voices are already calling Afghanistan ‘Obama’s Vietnam’, advocating a lessening of goals, and poll numbers show a surprisingly negative view of a US military presence in the country, with about 50% believing we should start drawing down troops immediately.  Some of these people raise valid and thoughtful arguments that can be quite persuasive.  IR scholar and arch realist Stephen Walt lays out the realist approach to US policy in Afghanistan quite well,  Here is his succinct description of US national interests in Afghanistan:

“We have only one vital national interest in Afghanistan: to prevent Afghan territory from being used as a safe haven for groups plotting attacks on American soil or on Americans abroad, as al Qaeda did prior to September 11. It might be nice to achieve some other goals too (such as economic development, better conditions for women, greater political participation, etc.), but these goals are neither vital to U.S. national security nor central to the future of freedom in the United States or elsewhere. Deep down, we don’t (or shouldn’t) care very much who governs in Afghanistan, provided they don’t let anti-American bad guys use their territory to attack us. As I recall, President Bush was even willing to let the Taliban stay in power in 2001 if they had been willing to hand us Osama and his henchmen.”

Indeed, there are many people in this country that are sympathetic to this reasoning.  But there also many who would fight it vigorously.  Senator John McCain and Senator Joe Lieberman, both strong advocates for the ‘surge’ in Iraq, call for a similar strategy and commitment for Afghanistan.  They unabashedly believe that if the US is truly committed it can ‘win’, that’s right ‘win’, in Afghanistan, and this would include helping build a strong, representative government along with defeating the Taliban and Al Qaeda.  Here’s their side:

“The war in Afghanistan can be won. Success — a stable, secure, self-governing Afghanistan that is not a terrorist sanctuary — can be achieved. Just as in Iraq, there is no shortcut to success, no clever “middle way” that allows us to achieve more by doing less. A minimalist approach in Afghanistan is a recipe not for winning smarter but for losing slowly at tremendous cost in American lives, treasure and security.”

They call on Obama to follow his campaign pledge that Afghanistan is a ”war we must win.”  The tone of the McCain-Lieberman is supportive, but also concerned, as you can tell they fear Obama may go the other way.  I call their approach ‘realist-liberal’ because they base their strategy on hard policies of more troops and political will, but have an end goal that Afghanistan become a pluralist, democratic state because that itself will help secure US national interests by keeping extremists marginalized.  Just like in Iraq, their argument basically states that if we take a minimalist approach in Afghanistan, we will just be back again and again.  This strategy is based on the belief that an open, democratic society will be more peaceful toward the US and its neighbors and through time erode extremism, all IR liberal viewpoints.  

Obama’s choice will probably be a tightrope between both of these policies.  His choice of language concerning the conflict will be vital.  Will he pledge to be there ’til the job is done’ or will he take a more subtle approach?  Americans will be listening, as the poll numbers show what they hear will be crucial, but even more important will be the fact that Afghans, Pakistanis, Al Qaeda, and the Taliban-led insurgents will be to.

A hot topic recently is Obama’s foreign policy ‘realism’. Now those who visit this site regularly already know that I’ve called Obama on his realism DAYS AGO! There are those who applaud this approach, arguing that the best foreign policy doctrine is not to have one. Then there are those who fear this outcome, asserting that one of America’s greatest assets is its promotion and defense of democracy and human rights.

This brings up two issues before we can argue for either side; 1. Has Obama truly shown himself a realist by his policies? 2. And is he really departing so completely from President Bush’s so-called ‘freedom agenda’? First off, I believe that all US presidents have been at least partially liberal in their world view, even those early presidents who lead a weak, fragile state at the time. That being said, it is not like these guys only had international liberalism in their bones, blood, and sinew, as they all followed the rules of power politics in most cases, from the Jay Treaty to the Bush’s partnership with Pervez Musharraf. Bush full heartedly tried to bring democracy to two despotic states, called the Darfur conflict a genocide, criticized the Burmese military dictatorship, gave prime time to political dissidents from China and elsewhere, and made many key speeches preaching the power of liberty and human rights. YET, he cozied up with dictators in Pakistan, Egypt, China, and Kazakhstan, used military force in pursuit of US interests, and disregarded many multilateral treaties. Bush was followed both a realist and liberal foreign policy.

Barack’s election rhetoric and policies so far have definitely trended more realist (and in many ways logically follow many of Bush’s policies). He has has openly stated he will negotiate with many dictator-run states (Iran, Syria, North Korea), put NATO expansion on hold, let Russia know that deals involving security trade offs could be made, treated Britain like it was just a ‘state’, rarely discusses the liberal threesome of liberty, democracy, and human rights in speeches, and his Sec of State Hilary Clinton stated that human rights would not get in the way of US-China relations. This being considered, Obama has also leaned liberal on many occasions. His emphasis on ‘talking’ and diplomacy are not just realist measures, but seem to him to be modern ways that conflicts are solved. He has also reached out to the Muslim world in a widely heard interview and plans on making a speech in a Muslim-majority country this year. Obama also showed his trust of international institutions and treaties by raising the US ambassador to the United Nations to a Cabinet Position and in his early discussions with Russia about arms reductions and Europe regarding climate change. But overall, I do agree with the aforementioned articles that Obama is mainly following a realist foreign policy so far. (of course so did Bush before 9/11)

I googled 'Realism vs. Liberalism' and this was the first picture that came up.

So should we be concerned or pleased about Obama’s realist leanings? I think, like when given the choice between chocolate and strawberry ice cream, a little of both. The realist attributes of cautiousness and pragmatism are indeed valuable and Obama seems keen on following them in many of his policies so far. International relations are indeed fraught with dangers of missteps and a realist viewpoint can prevent the US from unforeseen calamities and overzealousness. However, if the US becomes more and more just like another state, it not only denies what it has been for its entire history, a beacon of liberty and hope, but it may also undermine the growth of a stable world, which has made a steady climb in democratization. It is not an overstatement to say the current strength of democratic governance in the international system is held up by American leadership. Specifically, states in Eastern Europe, Ukraine, Georgia, the Baltic States, and Poland, in many ways have their sovereignty and free political system dependent on US/NATO engagement and protection. These states will not welcome the canceling of the missile defense system treaty or talk of NATO expansion quietly fading away. In terms of Afghanistan and Iraq’s governing future, Obama has already laid framework for a less than democratic outcome. I also hear loudly how much Obama has NOT spoken about the power of liberty, democracy, and human rights and I think this is a shame as the world is listening.

Washington Post columnist Richard Cohen poignantly quoted an Obama intro to one of theologian/realist theorist Reinhold Niebuhr’s books: “there’s serious evil in the world, and hardship and pain. We should be humble and modest in our belief we can eliminate those things. But we shouldn’t use that as an excuse for cynicism and inaction.”